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Primarily based on Chinese perceptions of sovereignty and their national strategic frontiers,
this study attempts to discern patterns in PRC uses of force to attain foreign policy objectives.
Both concepts are instrumental in understanding when and where the Chinese are willing to use
force. For the PRC there exists a dual concept of sovereignty that extends from territorial to
influential. Not only is Chinese control expected within its recognized borders, but also
predominating Chinese influence is expected in areas outside the territorial borders of the PRC.
Exactly where this perceived sphere of influence has been at any given time is difficult to establish.
Through a twelve case study pattern analysis, this thesis demonstrates that the PRC has repeatedly
been willing to use force to ensure their primacy of influence. As the strength of the Chinese
nation expands and contracts, so has the PRC definition and application of Chinese influence.
This work also identifies past demarcations of the PRC's strategic frontier and how far Chinese
strategic interests might extend in the future. Within the last twenty-five years there has been a
shift in PRC focus from a continental to a maritime frontier. As Chinese comprehensive national
strength allows, the maritime claims of the PRC will be defended with force in the name of
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This thesis attempts to discern patterns in the People's Republic of China (PRC) uses of
force to attain foreign policy objectives. First, an attempt is made to determine if there was an
inclination inherited from pre-communist Chinese history which favored or disdained the use of
force to solve disputes. Conventional wisdom maintains the latter. According to this argument,
China had a pacifist tradition which eschewed the use of force. Known as the Confucian-Mencian
Paradigm, this tradition holds that the Chinese perceived the use of force only as a last resort.
When it was necessary, it was most often used defensively in a limited, controlled manner.
Occasional exceptions included punitive wars. Proponents of the Confucian-Mencian paradigm
maintain that it prevails in Chinese thinking even today. The Chinese would like the world to
believe this view as well.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, an alternative view began to emerge. Concurrent with the
rise of the comprehensive national strength of the People's Republic, a reassessment of the
conventional view toward the Chinese use of force led to the development of a parabellum
strategic culture viewpoint. The parabellum paradigm asserts that Chinese culture was
historically not averse to using force to solve disputes and in fact sought resolution via military
means when conditions were favorable. Parabellum proponents argue that China was
exceptionally flexible in its application of force and was willing to use accommodationist
strategies until conditions were ripe for more assertive postures. This thesis argues that the
pzcifist-parabellum cultures coexisted and alternated in predominance in a rhythmic manner as the
strength of the Chinese nation ebbed and flowed with the dynastic cycle.
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While the literature is relatively sparse with respect to establishing patterns in the PRC's
crisis and conflict behavior, several conclusions have stood the test of time. PRC crisis and
conflict behavior demonstrates an emphasis on timing and pauses in crisis and conflict. Likewise,
history demonstrates that the PRC is traditionally not averse to taking risks against a far superior
military power. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis reiterated this point. Another PRC
tradition is a pragmatic, at times opportunistic, flexibility in the face of changing threats. Finally,
contrary to the theory that territorial disputes will abate as the state increases in age, there has
been a fairly consistent, if not increasing tendency of the PRC to engage in territorial disputes as
the Chinese have expanded their frontiers and asserted additional irredentist claims. In general,
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been used as an offensive tool more often than not. The
case study analysis provided here confirms this view—none of the PRC uses of force to attain
foreign policy objectives were within Core China.
None of the works reviewed in this thesis, however, sufficiently analyzes the connection
between PRC perceptions of sovereignty, their national strategic frontiers, and their willingness to
use force. China's national territory has always been in a state of flux, expanding and contracting
with the strength of the nation. This thesis demonstrates that the Chinese, indeed Asian, view of
spatial boundaries led to ambiguity over the actual territorial extent of the Middle Kingdom. The
collision of Western political theory and Asian political practices led to a blurring of the
interrelationship of suzerainty and sovereignty vis-a-vis influence and control. In the minds of the
PRC elite, this confusion still exists. Areas that have traditionally only been strongly influenced by
Chinese culture are also expected to fall within the PRC orbit. Thus, not only was Chinese and
later PRC control expected within the recognized borders of China without foreign interference,
xii
but their leaders also expected predominating Chinese influence in areas that have historically
been under the suzerainty of the Chinese people. As the strength of the Chinese nation expands
and contracts, so does its definition and application of its influence as well as its concomitant
strategic frontier. This thesis demonstrates that the PRC has been willing to use force to ensure
this primacy of influence.
But to the Chinese, PLA actions in these regions have been justified as reunification of the
Motherland or fighting off imperialists and hegemonists. Their anxiety and mistrust of foreign
intrusion and interference are predominantly based on the treatment China received from the
imperial powers during their century of humiliation and are best exemplified by their obsession
with sovereignty. This work identifies three areas in which the Chinese asserted their sovereignty
and influence: Core China, Greater China, and regionally. The case study pattern analysis
demonstrates that the second and third areas have provided the impetus for conflict more than the
first. Conflicts involving sovereignty within Greater China were essentially aimed at reunification.
Conflicts involving influence were regional. Thus, it is demonstrated that a dual concept of PRC
sovereignty exists that extends from territorial to influential. The latter concept implies an
assertion of Chinese influence in regions outside the territorial borders of the PRC. It is difficult
to establish exactly where this perceived sphere of influence has been at any given time. But as
the strength of the nation allowed, regions such as Tibet, Chinese Turkestan, Korea, Vietnam, and
elsewhere fell within the Chinese and later PRC orbit.
The analysis of PRC conflicts confirms these points, and alarmingly perhaps, signals a
rising tide of expansion as the strength of the PRC grows and opportunities arise. The second
research question asks if any lessons from previous uses of force by the PRC can aid in
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recognizing future uses of the PLA for foreign policy objectives. This question is analyzed vis-a-
vis PLA modernization, which has received renewed emphasis. Technology and power projection
are stressed in the PLA's new force structure. Together with the doctrine of active defense, this
bodes for a PLA which seeks to meet the enemy at a distance or on the Chinese periphery.
Aspirations for an advanced force capable of making this doctrine credible do not ensure
success. Nevertheless, PRC military modernization remains a regional concern. This work
identifies where and how far PRC strategic interests might extend in the region. Certainly, there
has been a shift in PRC focus from a continental to a maritime frontier. PRC official
pronouncements and unofficial but sanctioned articles are clear in stating that a Chinese expansion
within the maritime frontier is needed to secure living space and economic resources. Two
defensive island chain perimeters have been proposed as a demarcation of Chinese control and
interests. As the situation permits, Beijing will defend this territory as it is perceived to contribute
to the national comprehensive strength.
As PRC strength grows, Sino-American interests are surely going to collide. The
diametrically opposed national policies of PRC sovereignty versus American "shaping the
international environment" will continue to plague the two. countries' relations. As this thesis
suggests, however, the Chinese will be pragmatic and will not upset economic development
which, along with domestic stability, will remain the top priority of the CCP.
Nevertheless, many sources of potential PRC conflict exist. Taiwan remains the most
volatile and contentious issue. Most likely, the PRC will back up its threats of force should it
perceive Taiwan as carrying its "splittist" activities too far. Only a slightly reduced chance for
conflict exists on China's maritime frontier where the territorial disputes over the South China Sea
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continue. The PRC continental frontiers are relatively secure. As long as the Koreans, Indians,
Vietnamese, and Russians do not attempt to upset the status quo, the PRC will likely not instigate
conflict in these areas. Even the considerable irredentist claims against Russia in Northeast Asia
will not be pressed as long as the PLA remains dependent upon Russian military technology.
It is hoped that this thesis will help develop a greater understanding of the PRC's decision
to use force based on national interests and trends in previous PRC crisis and conflict
management. In that sense, this thesis uses historical analysis not for predictive value, but for its
ability to provide insights into the strategic context in which the PRC functions. This may help
our understanding of Chinese policies. We should analyze PRC interests and willingness to use
force to protect those interests from a position of greater understanding of where they have been
and where they intend to go as a country. If we know China's interests, we can better calculate
when and where they will choose altercation over accommodation. If we understand the









At a glance, it would appear that East Asia is more secure than it has been since the end of
the Second World War. The Spring 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan on the sub-continent
notwithstanding, the People's Republic of China (PRC), in particular, enjoys its most secure
environment in its existence. Indeed, the country has not been more peaceful since the middle
Qing era. However, many security analysts see storm clouds looming on the horizon as economic
problems and historic animosities rise to the surface. Even more troubling, many argue, is the
return of the fabled Chinese dragon rising like a phoenix from the ashes of one hundred fifty years
of humiliation. The rapid developmental progress of the PRC is unquestioned. Over the last
twenty-five years the PRC's economic growth is the highest recorded in its history. 1 Along with
this economic development is a massive military modernization program that started in earnest in
the mid-1980s. Despite previous and projected cuts in size approaching 1.5 million men, the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) has made significant strides in improving its capabilities. PRC
intentions remain suspect, however. The question of how a modernized PLA will be used is the
focus of the fear and apprehensions experienced by so many both in the region and around the
globe.
A. PURPOSE
It is extremely difficult to forecast PLA activities without an appreciation of previous uses
of the PLA in pursuit of foreign policy objectives by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Thus, it is the purpose of this thesis to locate trends in PRC conflict management with a special
1
See Zuliu Hu and Mohsin S. Khan, "Why Is China Growing So Fast?," International Monetary Fund.
1997. Source obtained online at [http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/IMF_7].
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focus on how it is related to the Chinese concept of sovereignty and what has been described as
China's strategic frontier. The thesis will contain six chapters including this introduction:
I. Introduction
n. Survey of the Literature
HJ. Case Study Parameters
IV. Case Studies
V. Analysis and Synthesis
VI. Conclusion
Chapter I will introduce the reader to the topic, outline the purpose, and discuss the methodology
of the thesis. Although there are numerous studies of PRC conflicts, most are case study specific
and do not offer interpretative patterns. The attempts that have been made in determining
patterns in PRC conflict behavior are by no means comprehensive, nor have they been altogether
enlightening. In addition to a brief survey and comparison of previous analytical attempts at
determining patterns in PRC crisis and conflict behavior, Chapter II will provide a discussion of
the pre-Communist Chinese view toward using force, analyze what has historically been regarded
as China's national territory, and provide the reader with a contemporary context by discussing
the China Threat Theory. Chapter in will provide the reader with a contextual background from
which to approach the subsequent case study chapter. It will also define in detail the terms that
will be included in Chapter rV's analysis. Chapter IV consists of a comparative twelve case
study2 review of PRC conflict and crisis behavior vis-a-vis the Chinese concepts of sovereignty
and strategic frontier. Chapter V will be conclusions arrived at from the case study analysis data
as well as a synthesis of the arguments presented thus far. Chapter V will also discuss PLA
- The twelve case studies are: Tibet (1950), Korea (1950-1953), Taiwan Straits (1954-1955, 1958), India
(1962), Vietnam (1965-1969), USSR (1969), Xisha Islands (1974), Vietnam (1979), Johnson Reef (1988),
Mischief Reef (1995), Taiwan Straits (1995-1996).
modernization and examine the implications it might have on U.S. policy and the PRC's most
likely areas of conflict. Chapter VI will review the conclusions arrived at from the previous
chapters' analyses.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
The central question asked throughout this thesis is: are there discernible patterns in PRC
threats or uses of force to attain foreign policy objectives? In particular, the thesis will attempt to
answer this question with respect to the Chinese concept of sovereignty and their perception of
the PRC's national strategic frontier. It will be argued that the former concept is crucial to
understanding when, and the latter perception crucial to understanding where the Chinese use
force. After a compilation of data from the case studies, a second question will focus on: what, if
any, lessons from previous uses of force by the PRC can aid in understanding future uses of the
PLA for foreign policy objectives? This question will be answered with respect to PLA
modernization and potential implications for U.S. policy.
The primary method with which these questions will be addressed is through case study
pattern analysis. For each case study, a brief description of events will be followed by a more
detailed examination. Each case study analysis will be based upon the parameters outlined in
Chapter in. Cumulative case study data and interpretations will provide both objective and
subjective conclusions respectively. The former will be the empirical data while the latter will
include more deductive determinations. Specifically, Chapter in definitions will allow objective
conclusions to be achieved through the cumulative empirical case study results. 3 Subjective
5
It is acknowledged that the author's inteipretations and analysis of each case study based on the
definitions contained in Chapter III is to some degree subjective. Nevertheless, such a procedure allows one to
quantify PRC conflicts and crises based on several crucial criteria that might shed light on past as well as future
conclusions will be developed as a means to elicit possible implications for the future.
Several other issues will be addressed in order to place the experience of the PRC in using
force in perspective with not only Chinese history but with the present course of PRC military
modernization as well. The first is a survey of literature that has analyzed the Chinese propensity
to use force to solve international disputes. The survey will be addressed in the next chapter.
Knowledge of the different interpretations of imperial China's propensity to use force will provide
the reader with a groundwork with which to approach the case study chapter. These conclusions,
arrived at from an examination of China's use of force in the past, reveal a changing perception of
a munificent China to one significantly more prone to use force to solve disputes than was
previously thought.
The second issue is PLA modernization. PRC efforts at military modernization will be
addressed in Chapter V in order to provide the reader with a perspective of recent attempts by the
PRC to mold their military into an effective fighting force capable of projecting power across their
borders. Modernization analysis will shed light on where Beijing expects future conflicts and how
they intend to fight. Likewise, PLA doctrinal shifts reveal where and how the PRC envisions
future conflicts to erupt. These analyses tend to support the conclusion that the PRC is
emphasizing power projection capabilities, especially within its naval and air forces, in order to be
prepared for conflicts on the Chinese periphery
—
particularly the maritime periphery.
Finally, the contemporary PRC view of its strategic frontiers will be assessed. If taken at
face value, PRC and particularly PLA elite views on the concomitant relationship between China's
"'comprehensive national strength" and "national territory" are alarming. Implications for Sino-
uses of the PLA.
American security concerns are important and must be measured to ensure each country's views
and policies, which are inherently inimical, do not lead to unavoidable conflict. Where Chinese
strategic interests may cause friction with other states and ignite conflict is the last topic
addressed. During the last twenty-five years the Chinese have shifted from a purely continental to
a largely maritime focus, making this area their most likely stage of future conflict. Nevertheless,
considerable Chinese interests remain on the Asian continent and, if threatened, could lead to
military action there as well.
C. RELEVANCE
With a population approaching 1.3 billion people the PRC is the world's largest country
and remains one of the United States' most pressing concerns for East Asian security in the 21 st
century. PRC reforms, both economic and military, have made them a more powerful player in
the region. Successful reforms could make China an even stronger potential opponent or a more
valuable strategic partner. PLA modernization through technological advances will provide
enhanced capability, if not parity, vis-a-vis China's potential adversaries in the region, including
the United States. How they will employ this capability remains an open question. A greater
understanding of prior uses of force by the PRC will aid in determining subsequent intentions of
the PLA and future casus belli. As noted by Alastair Iain Johnston, this does not presuppose
future behavior can be predicted by a study of past events, but it is a good place to start.4
4
Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992: A First Cut at the
Data," The China Quarterly, No. 153 (March 1998): 1.

II. SURVEYING THE LITERATURE
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
What does pre-communist history suggest about the Chinese inclination to use force?
There are conflicting conclusions, but it should be noted that the qualifications of sovereignty and
territorial integrity that are examined in this work's case studies are not applicable to most of pre-
1949 Chinese history. Until relatively recent times, China had different concepts of spatial
boundaries than the typical Western ideal. Indeed, Europe was still in the process of developing
these principles when their search for spices first brought them and their ideas to Asian shores.
The fact that Asia's traditional views of space and national territory were quite different from the
modern view we hold today provides one explanation why irredentist claims in Asia have been so
difficult to deal with in modern times. 5
1. A Confucian-Mencian Pacifist Tradition?
However, one can still attempt to ascertain if the Chinese have developed during their long
history a definable strategic culture6 with which they view the use of force. Conventional wisdom
When Europeans first began arriving in significant numbers in the 16th century they brought with them
the idea of spatial boundaries to a region that had hence only known delimitation at best and overlapping power
centers at its murkiest. Not until the 19 th century did Europeans themselves start claiming the land (and hence
surrounding sea) as their own. The Asians were slow to realize what was happening and even then could do little
about Western territorial claims. Indeed, much of the present-day Asian claims in the South China Sea originated
with their former colonizers. For an excellent analysis of the concept of spatial and non-spatial constructs of
national territory see Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body ofa Nation (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1994).
6
Although he listed many working definitions, Alastair Iain Johnston defined strategic culture as "an
integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to
establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of
military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious." Johnston went on to say that "strategic culture
consists of two key elements. The first is a central paradigm or a central set of assumptions that provides answers
to three questions: what role does conflict or warfare play in human affairs; what is the nature of the enemy and the
holds that since the end of the bellicose Spring and Autumn Period (722-481 B.C.), Chinese
strategic thinking was influenced by the essential passivity and morality of Confucian and later the
exaggerated idealism of Mencian thought. This Confucian-Mencian Paradigm holds that the
Chinese perceived the use of force only as a last resort. When it was necessary, it was most often
used defensively (with some qualifications including punitive wars) and in a limited controlled
manner.
7
Perhaps the standard bearer of such arguments was John K. Fairbank who pointed to a
"pacifist bias" in China. Fairbank argued that "warfare was disesteemed in this [Confucian]
imperial orthodoxy of the Han bureaucrats, and the disesteem was given an ethical basis that
colored Chinese thinking ever since."8
2. The Parabellum Paradigm
How then, does one explain the centuries, even millennia, of Chinese warfare that existed
not only within China but also outside its borders? Scholars at the Chinese Academy of Military
Sciences counted 3,790 recorded wars of both internal and external origin from the period of the
Western Zhou (ca. 1 100 B.C.) to the end of the Qing Dynasty in 191 1. 9 From the "First
Emperor"Qin Shih Huangdi's (reigned 246-210 B.C.) unification campaigns; the remarkable Han
threat it poses; and how efficacious is the use of force in dealing with threats to state security?" The second
element is based on "the empirical footprint of strategic culture and should be a ranked set of grand strategic
preferences that is consistent across relevant objects of analysis." See Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism:
Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 36,
248.
Ibid., 62-66. Note, Johnston catalogues a considerable array of contemporary proponents of this
Chinese Confucian-Mencian pacifist tradition. I will not attempt to replicate them here.
John K. Fairbank, "Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience," in Chinese Ways in
Warfare, eds. Frank A. Kierman, Jr. and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 6.
Johnston, Cultural Realism, 27.
(206 B.C.-221 A.D.) expansion under Wu Di; incessant warfare during the Three Kingdoms
period (220-280); the expansion during the Sui and Tang dynasties (581-907) into Annam
(Vietnam), Taiwan, Tibet, Chinese Turkestan, Korea; up through the Qing dynasty, the history of
China is replete with examples of aggressive internal and external warfare. Tang territorial
control and suzerainty were essentially the high water marks for the Chinese empire. At its
height, the Tang extended Chinese influence over a huge area from southern Siberia to Southeast
Asia westward through Tibet and Central Asia to the Caspian Sea. 10 As the dynastic cycle took
its course, so too did contraction and re-expansion of the empire, approaching the frontiers set by
the Tang. It should be noted however, while reclamation of lost territories was later termed
"reunification," these lands initially came into the empire through expansionism.
Johnston is one of the few who dispute the accuracy of labeling China as a pacifist state.
He argued instead for viewing China within a parabellum paradigm. 11 While the Confucian-
Mencian paradigm did in fact exist, it was dominated by the less espoused parabellum strategic
culture. Johnston qualified this assertion by arguing that the Chinese concept of absolute
flexibility (quan biari) mediated the offensive application of violence. Offensive violence "is likely
to be successful only if strategic conditions are ripe. Until such time... strategy should be aimed at
creating these conditions. Under certain limited, temporary circumstances, this may require less
10
John K. Fairbank. and others., East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, 5th Edition (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1989), chap. 3-9 passim, but especially see 62-65, 96-99.
1 1
Johnston defines the parabellum paradigm as one that accepts: ( 1 ) warfare and conflict as relatively
constant features of interstate affairs, (2) a zero-sum characterization of conflict, and (3) war and violence as a
highly efficacious means for dealing with conflict. See Johnston, Cultural Realism, 61. Very much arealpolitik
model, the literal translation of the phrase from which the parabellum paradigm is derived is "if you want peace,
prepare for war" (si pacem parabellum).
coercive, even accommodationist strategies." 12 Therefore, the existence of a culture favorable to
the use of force to solve disputes does not guarantee the use of such methods at every
circumstance.
Johnston used ancient Chinese texts on war and strategy compiled together in one work as
the Seven Military Classics 13 for theoretical evidence of a more bellicose China than traditionally
believed. Ironically, these are some of the same texts the proponents of the Confucian-Mencian
tradition cite to support their claim of a pacifist tradition in China. The most notable of which is
Sun Zrs The Art of War which includes such benign phrases as "subduing the enemy without
fighting," "invincibility is a matter of defense, vulnerability is a matter of attack," and "attacking
the enemy's strategy first" to reference just a few. 14 However, Johnston concluded that, with an
occasional exception, the texts support the parabellum paradigm over the Confucian-Mencian
tradition. To test his hypothesis, Johnston used the Chinese relationship with the non-Han
peoples, especially the Mongols, during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). While mediated by the
quan bian concept, he again concluded the evidence (Ming policy arguments and decision making
with regard to using force) supports the preeminence of a parabellum strategic culture. During
12
Ibid., 249.
13 As the UUe suggests, Seven Military Classics was a collection of seven works written between 600 B.C.
and 600 A.D. and compiled in 1083. For an English version of this work, see Ralph D. Sawyer, trans.. The Seven
Military Classics ofAncient China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).
14
Griffith, Samuel B., Sun Tzu: The Art ofWar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), passim but
especially Chapter III translation of "Offensive Strategy." Roger Ames, in a comparison of Sun Zi to classical
Western strategy, implicitly favors the parabellum paradigm although he too admits the existence of a Confucian
tradition. He writes of a "militarist domination of die Confucians.'* but argues that the militarist texts are
"extension[sl and instantiation[s] of the philosophical tenets of the 'schools" to which they belong. In other words,
these texts [such as the Seven Military Classics] describe the implications of philosophical ideas in the practical
area of military affairs." See Roger Ames, "The Sunzi Legacy and Classical Western Strategy: A Tale of Two
Warfares" in Chinese Military Modernization, eds. C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu
(Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1996), 19-20.
10
the Ming dynasty alone, an average of 1 . 12 external wars occurred per year through the entire
276 years of its existence. 15 The fact that the Chinese compiled this data for the Ming period
(which is considered by some to be the prototypical Chinese dynasty) and not the foreign
controlled Yuan (Mongol) or Qing (Manchu) dynasties is critical to refuting arguments that any
expansionism or militarism that emanated from China was the product of barbarian periods of rule
and not indigenous Han rule. Later, the Warlord Period (191 1-1928) and the subsequent wars
between the Nationalists and Communists touched every facet of Chinese life and consciousness.
Therefore, while it may not completely invalidate the traditional Confucian-Mencian
interpretation, the parabellum paradigm provides a more accurate picture of pre- 1949 Chinese
tendencies.
3. The Chinese World View
Thus, when the Peoples' Republic was proclaimed on 1 October 1949, the Chinese
Communist nation had a distinct strategic culture that transcended not only the previous imperial
government, but also the subsequent Nationalist attempt at governing the mainland as well. The
nearly incessant warfare that had ruled Chinese life since the end of the empire only served to
buttress the view of force as the ultimate arbiter of disputes. Even the defensivist claims vis-a-vis
Japanese aggression and the brief United Front between the Communists and Nationalists proved
to be a sham. Both sides all but collaborated with the Japanese in order to save strength for more
offensive pursuits against each other once the Western Allies had defeated Japan. 16
Another slowly developed viewpoint culminated with the birth of the People's Republic.
15
Johnston, Cultural Realism, 27.
16
See Edward L. Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949, (New York: Longman Publishing, 1995), 266.
II
The Chinese believed their long slow and painful decline from greatness to a subjugated nation at
the hands of the Western and Japanese imperialists had finally come to an end. PRC leaders saw
China as a rising power—rising to the heights it had held previously and should have held all
along if it were not for bankrupt (imperialist) policies and false (capitalist) ideology.
Mao Zedong and the rest of the CCP elite did much to play up the end of the Chinese
"century of humiliation" and the beginning of a return to Chinese greatness. Yet, the Chinese
perception of their place in the global hierarchy was not new. The Sinocentric perception dates
from their history of greatness and their concept of China as the Middle Kingdom. Sinocentrism
affects much of their policy and security sensitivities even today. Steven I. Levine proposes an
"informal ideology" or world view that pervades Chinese policy and decision making. Levine'
s




The Chinese are a great people, and China is a great nation.
2. The Chinese nation deserves a much better fate than that which it has experienced in the modem world.
3. China should be accorded compensatory treatment from those powers which have insulted or injured it
in the past.
4. As a great nation. China naturally occupies a central position in world affairs and must be treated as a
great power.
5. China's national sovereignty must be respected absolutely, and such respect precludes any foreign
criticism of China's internal policies.
6. China's special virtue in international affairs consists in the fact that its foreign policy is based not on
expediency but on immutable principles that express universal values such as justice and equality.
Figure 1. Levine 's Chinese World View
Source: Steven I. Levine, "Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy," eds., Thomas W. Robinson and
David Shambaugh, Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 43.
Levine's informal ideology can be referenced as a foundation for China's strategic culture.
He offers a much more idealized perspective than Johnston's realist typology. Levine's world
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view is based on Chinese perceptions of their own foreign policy. More importantly, it is what
they would like others to believe and not necessarily reality. Regardless, Levine characterizes the
idealism that the Chinese profess and that many others accept as fundamental to their foreign
policy. For this study's purposes, his characterization provides a rationalization for some
elements of Chinese foreign policy decision making, namely Beijing's obsession with sovereignty
and territorial integrity.
B. PATTERNS IN CONFLICT
Even if one accepts that pre- 1949 China had a tendency to favorably view the use of force
to solve disputes, there is no guarantee a similar view would also exist throughout the Communist
era. This section will survey prior attempts at establishing patterns in the PRC's use of force. A
considerable amount of material on PRC conflicts exists. However, most are single, specific case-
studies that do not offer comments on overall PRC crisis management and conflict behavior since
1949. Few attempts have even come away with substantive conclusions. The most ambitious
work yet concluded that "no real pattern exists" in the PRC's use of force. 17 The following
literature survey is based on sources which examine trends in PRC conflict management.
1. Calculus of Deterrence
Alan S. Whiting's The Chinese Calculus ofDeterrence in 1975 set the early standard.
18
17
Gerald Segal. Defending China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 1. Segal's work is still
the most ambitious and in many ways the most similar to this study.
18 While Whiting's work (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1975) was not the first, it
was the best early analysis into PRC conflict behavior. Another interesting analysis in this period is Steve Chan's.
"Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessments from a Perspective of Conflict Management," World
Politics, No. 2 (1978): 391-410. Chan examines five conflicts including Korea, the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958,
the Sino-Indian War, Vietnam (1964-1965). and the Sino-Soviet War. He finds five general phases similar in each
conflict consistent with PRC actions: (1) probing, (2) warning, (3) demonstration. (4) attack, and (5) detente, 395.
Chan also does an excellent job of compiling numerous sources of interest. For a thorough but by no means
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Whiting"s analysis of Chinese conflict behavior centered on the 1962 Sino-Indian border dispute.
He also included PLA actions in the Korean War and its deployment to the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV) in the 1960s. He used these three conflicts to determine a distinct Chinese
calculus of deterrence. 19 Whiting studied PRC behavior rather than classical Chinese strategic
thinking such as Sun Zi or Mao. Citing a '"consensual core of perceptions and behavior" of
"strategists in Beijing," Whiting did not attempt to identify, whether from individuals or
organizations, the origins of the calculus. 20 Using Johnston's strategic culture definition as a
primer, Whiting's calculus is in fact a Chinese strategic culture of deterrence.
Based on his three case studies, Whiting's paradigm was predicated on a set of
"deterrence principles that reflect [PRC] patterns of perception and behavior" (see Figure 2).21
The first proposition was based on a traditional Chinese proverb that "disorder from within"
invariably leads to "danger from without." Linked with the second point which argued "the best
deterrence is belligerence," the admonition to prepare for the worst-case threat scenarios implied
a PRC parabellum posture which recognized the utility of force or the threat of force in attaining
foreign policy objectives. However, Whiting contradicted this supposition several times. In his
conclusion, he explicitly downplayed the role that force plays in PRC foreign policy. "The use of
complete listing of previous works on Chinese conflict behavior see Chan, 393-395(nn. 10, 12).
19
Whiting defines calculus of deterrence as "an attempt to infer what general strategy [emphasis added]
underlies persistent patterns of behavior aimed at persuading a perceived opponent that the costs of his continuing




Ibid., 202-203. The subsequent discussion of Whiting's three propositions is derived from Chinese
Calculus, 202-220.
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1. The worse our domestic situation, the more likely our external situation will worsen.
a) A superior power in proximity will seek to take advantage of our domestic vulnerability.
b) Two or more powers will combine against us if they can temporarily overcome their own
conflicts of interest.
c) We must prepare for the worst and try for the best.
2. The best deterrence is belligerence.
a) To be credible, move military force; words do not suffice.
b) To be diplomatic, leave the enemy "face" and a way out.
c) To be prudent, leave yourself an "option."
d) If at first you don't succeed, try again but more so.
3. Correct timing is essential.
a) Warning must be given early when a threat is perceived but not yet imminent.
b) The rhythm of signals must permit the enemy to respond and us to confirm the situation.
c) We must control our moves and not respond according to the enemy's choice.
Figure 2. Whiting's Threats and Deterrence Principles as Seen from Beijing
Source: Whiting, Chinese Calculus, 202-203.
force," he argued, "is not a paramount characteristic of Chinese foreign policy as manifested in
the behavior of the People's Republic over the past quarter of a century."22 Yet, he also argued
that "PRC foreign policy has not eschewed the use of force in less threatening situations" than
Korea, India, and Vietnam (1965-1969) and that there exists "a fundamental policy which places a
premium on deterrent action against a threat to vital interests even when that threat comes from a
markedly stronger military power."23
Whiting concluded that while China regularly acts in a rational matter, its leaders often
2
Ibid., 243. To be fair. Whiting also added that the attention he gave die use of force was intentionally
selective. Nevertheless, the importance he gave the use of force for deterrence and die suspicion with which other





misperceive potential adversaries' intentions which result in a validation of the "disorder from
within—danger from without" theory. Often, Chinese misperceptions result in a self-fulfilling
prophecy. As Whiting points out, the Chinese feel that the best deterrence is belligerence.
Indeed, they are willing to take enormous risks, even in the face of war, when they perceive a
threat to their security. He qualified his conclusions by stating that PRC belligerence is typical of
reflexive moves by the PRC to an external threat stimulus. Initial Chinese actions are often more
constrained and limited. Limited PRC initial responses allow the enemy as well as the Chinese a
way out of difficult situations that entail great risks with disproportionate benefits. 24
The Chinese place particular importance in correct timing of deterrence moves. They seek to
establish early deterrent signals which change with strength based on the enemy's response.
Whiting points out the irony of clockwork-like diplomatic and military moves by the PRC during
the Korean and Indian preludes to conflict that "provided ample opportunity for functional
'feedback' by preserving options for both sides."25 This type of incrementalism has been evident
throughout PRC conflict behavior in various forms.
Whiting only briefly mentions one of the main themes of this thesis when he discusses
Chinese perceptions of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Yet, he appears to recognize the
centrality of these issues. He writes:26
It is impossible to exaggerate the psychological importance of past events in determining both
this perception [of territorial security] and the means adopted to deter and defeat the threats. ...
[However,] China's response to foreign pressure and penetration between 1840 and 1937 rarely








power whose sovereignty and territorial integrity depended more on the will of other nations than
of itself. . . [With] this cavalier treatment of Chinese sovereignty. . .it is understandable that any
situation involving China's territorial integrity is certain to arouse concern in Beijing. In
addition, it is likely to evoke a determined response designed to deter or defeat an opponent
before he can pose a more serious threat [my emphasis].
Again, he seems to contradict himself. On one hand he argues that the psychological importance
of territorial integrity cannot be exaggerated and threats to such are likely to evoke a determined
response, while on the other he points to "alternative" responses other than the use of force. On
this point, this author would argue that the Chinese attempted on numerous occasions to resist
imperial powers with force including Great Britain (1839-1842, 1856-60), France (1856-60,
1883-1885), Russia (1876-1878), Japan (1874, 1894-1895, 1931, 1937-1945), and the Boxer
Rebellion (1900). 27 Chinese non-resistance was due more to military impotence and a hope to
minimize the damage through negotiation than any true inclination toward pacifism. Overall,
however, Whiting was completely accurate regarding the significance of PRC perceptions of
threats to their territorial integrity and sovereignty. Unfortunately, he did not pursue these issues
at any length.
2. "No Consistency or Logic"
Gerald Segal authored another significant contribution to the study of PRC crisis and
conflict management. Published in 1985, Segal's Defending China concluded that there simply is
no consistency or logic to the PRC's use of force in foreign policy. PLA operations have been
characterized by pragmatic, at times opportunistic, flexibility in the face of changing threats.
Although no pattern was found, Segal did an excellent job of synthesizing numerous variables
within the context of PRC hostilities. However, perhaps the reason he found no pattern is
27
Fairbank, and others.. East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, 5,h Edition , chap. 16, 19-20, 25
passim.
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because he had too many variables instead of focusing on just a few key themes. His nine case
studies examined PRC objectives, how the PLA carried out its military operations, and the role of
domestic politics in China's use of force. He also included chapters on geography, history,
ideology, and institutions. Further themes included military strategy and tactics, and outside
powers' influence on the way in which the People's Republic uses its military power. No fewer
than ten research questions were considered. What he lacked in depth, he made up for in breadth.
Given the similarity of topics, all of Segal's conclusions remain germane to this study. A few
particularly relevant ones will be discussed here.
Segal determined that there have been at least four major types of actions by the PLA.
They include a deterrence/compellence model, an opportunistic model, an offensive model, and a
backfire model. 28 The first and last models only occurred once—the 1960s Vietnam intervention
and the 1969 border clashes with the Soviet Union respectively. The middle two models provide
a better picture. Segal defined the opportunistic model as a situation in which the PRC attempts
to capitalize on early military success by increasing the military pressure on an adversary.
Examples include Korea, Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-1955, and the Sino-Indian conflict. The
offensive model, usually beginning with a probe, culminates in the seizure of territory or
attempting to teach the enemy a lesson. Tibet, the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958, the Paracel
Islands seizure, and the punitive attack on Vietnam are examples of the offensive model. The
People's Liberation Army-Navy's (PLAN) subsequent excursions in the South China Sea in 1988
Segal defines the deterrence/compellence model as die need to compel an enemy to PRC demands if
deterrence had previously failed. The backfire model is when China begins with offensive purposes, but is forced
by a superior foe to take defensive action. The other two models are described above. For a more detailed
explanation of these models see Segal, 240-241. He also lists seven different objectives followed by the Chinese
which seems rather useless in a nine case study analysis.
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and 1995 also fit Segal's offensive model. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis falls into the
deterrence/compellence category since it appeared the PRC had no real intention of launching an
attack on Taiwan nor of probing US intentions.
Thus, according to Segal's analysis, seven of the nine case studies involved the offensive
use of force by the PRC to some extent (see Table 1). He maintained that his breakdown was
"not intended to suggest that China acts any more or less offensively than any other great power.
It is, however, intended to make clear that Chinese actions are at times aggressive" and that
"China acts pragmatically, seizing opportunities where it finds them."29 PRC pragmatism
Table 1
Segal's Types of PRC Military Actions 1949-1985
Model Frequency Conflict/Crisis








Source: Author based on Segal's typology, 240-241
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precludes Segal from accepting the unchanging calculus or logic of policy which Whiting
proposed. While Segal downplayed the evidence, past uses of force by the PRC suggest that,
despite claims to the contrary, the PLA is an offensive tool more often than not. If not offensive,




PRC domestic politics as a function of their propensity to use force was another important
element Segal examined. It has been frequently argued that a domestic dimension is critical to any
decision by the PRC to use force. 30 Indeed, domestic events juxtaposed against PRC conflicts
seem to validate this concept. The consolidation of communist power in 1949-1950, the
disastrous policies of the Great Leap Forward (1958), and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969)
generally coincide with aggressive moves by the PLA. Segal concluded, however, that a real link
between PRC domestic politics and the use of force can only be made in two cases—Korea and
Vietnam (1965-1969). Even in these instances the link was not the sole determinant. While
factional politics were a fact of life in the PRC during these periods, "There is little evidence to
support the opposing notion that China uses force in foreign policy to deflect internal dissent."31
Moreover, more recent events tend to disconfirm that domestic instability causes a more assertive
foreign policy. For instance, there was no saber-rattling following the Tiananmen Square events
in 1989.
In a final analysis, Segal structured his case studies on the Chinese objectives, how they
subsequently changed, and how successful the PRC was in achieving these objectives. Given this
context, his conclusion that there is no real pattern in the PRC's use of force is no surprise. Crisis
management and war are some of the most fluid of all human endeavors. Indeed, his opening
quotation was a Chinese description of how Mao "never adhered to one pattern. He always
30
This domestic dimension most often involves the argument that the CCP uses external threats to
diffuse internal disorder or Whiting's "disorder within-danger without" view. For a short list of studies that
espouse such a position see Greg Austin's "The Strategic Implications of China's Public Order Crisis," Survival,




adopted flexible strategic and tactical principles in the light of the political, economic, and military
conditions of the enemy and [the PRC]." 32
While Segal's study provided an excellent analysis of numerous variables affecting the
PRC's use of force, this thesis intends to take a step back and examine the Chinese objective
calculus for patterns. In other words, why did the PRC view certain objectives as worth fighting
for? Segal discussed this question in detail but never found a causal determinant to link the
various events because he focused on PRC input and output crisis variables rather than pre-
existing Chinese principles, such as their concept of sovereignty. Segal unfortunately did not fully
address the justification China uses to warrant its use of force nor did he sufficiently relate it to
ante-bellum security concerns vis-a-vis its perceptions of sovereignty.
3. The MID Study
A more recent and intriguing study is that of Alastair Iain Johnston in the March 1998
issue of The China Quarterly.^ He based his conclusions on research conducted by the
Correlates of War (CoW) research group at the University of Michigan. The group has collected
an enormous amount of data on management of international crises, known as Militarized
Interstate Disputes (MID), which it defines as "united historical cases in which the threat, display
or use of military force short of war by one member is explicitly directed towards. . .another
state."
34 The two key variables analyzed in MID data are the type of action taken and the goal.









There is no relationship between domestic unrest and China 's use offorce externally.
The data revealed that an increase in domestic unrest actually led to a decrease in MID-related
violence. This conclusion contradicts not only Whiting's "disorder within-danger without"
theory, but also the conclusions of many other China analysts as well. Johnston suggested that in
the event of domestic unrest, China becomes "pre-occupied" with internal issues and does not
become overly misperceptive about foreign intentions. 35 Segal's conclusions were consistent with
this first point.
2. There is no relationship between Chinese military expenditures and military
capabilities with PRC dispute-proneness.
Johnston's second observation contradicts the "China Threat" theorists (see below) who fear
increased Chinese economic and military power will lead to a more assertive foreign policy. It
should be noted, however, that this data is relative and based on past extreme military weakness
of the PRC that frequently they overcame only by sheer mass of men. What Beijing has
traditionally lacked in firepower and technology, they have made up with men and the willingness
to accept casualties. Increased fiscal expenditures aimed at PLA modernization will indeed make
the military a better force, but it is still unclear whether or not increased capability will translate
into a more assertive force. What is clear, however, is that the transition of the PLA to a
technology-oriented form of war rather than manpower-intensive warfare reflects Beijing's
Greg Austin agrees with Johnston. Austin states that "domestic crisis in China is more likely to be a
constraint on Chinese assertiveness abroad than an impetus to it." See Austin's "The Strategic Implications of
China's Public Order Crisis," 7. John K. Fairbank also implicitly agrees when he describes the origins of China's
inherent defensiveness as the result of "her primary concern for social order at home instead of expansion abroad."
He qualifies this assertion, however, by saying this propensity "came from her landlocked situation in North
China." See Fairbank. "Introduction," 3.
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recognition of the inefficacy of past doctrine in today's "modern high-tech conditions." 36
3. PRC dispute proneness is positively related to the gap in relative power between
China and other major powers in the system.
This third assertion is based on the theory that states which perceive a lack of international respect
accorded to them believe it "is a result of insufficient material power and their insufficient
willingness to demonstrate this power. The notion that the strategies chosen to close the status
gap should be coercive implies that states have internalized realpolitik world views where relative
material power is equated with relative status.'" 7 Johnston acknowledged the difficulty of
substantiating when PRC leaders are most dissatisfied with China's international status. His
evidence included Mao's known acceptance of this status argument as well as the CoW figures
for "national share ofmaterial capabilities." The CoW data suggested the lower the relative
capability of the PRC the higher its dispute proneness. 38 Assuming overall national wealth will
lead to an increase in military power, a subsequent conclusion is that as the PRC's economic
development and military modernization continue, the PRC propensity to engage in MJDs will
decrease. However, this inverse relationship somewhat contradicts Johnston's conclusion that
there is no relationship between PRC military capability (assumed to be dependent on overall
wealth) and dispute proneness.
The data to support these conclusions are also interesting, especially given the utility the
36
There are numerous primary sources which reflect this change in thinking and a concomitant shift in
doctrine. One excellent source is Chinese Views ofFuture Warfare, ed. Michael Pillsbury (Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University, 1997) which includes translated essays of PLA officers.
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Johnston, "China s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior,*' 26. Note, the first part of this statement





MID data provides in comparing the PRC with other states. Under MID criteria, the People's
Republic engaged in 1 18 disputes between 1949 and 1992, an average of 2.74 per year. This
ranks the PRC as the second most dispute prone state among the major powers during the period,
behind only the United States (see Table 2). For the entire data set representing most if not all of
each state's existence, the PRC is still second, this time to the Soviet Union (see Table 3). Again,
the data supports the parabellum view that the PRC favorably views the use of force to solve
disputes.
Table 2
Comparative Frequency of MIDs


















Source: Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992," 9.
The MID data reveals that the largest portion of PRC MIDs were territorial (as opposed
to policy or regime) in origin. While this is "consistent with the hypothesis that new states will be
more sensitive about establishing territorial control, and thus... [a] prevalence of territorial MIDs




point reached during 1969-1973. Moreover, the MID study classifies Taiwan as a regime dispute
but the CoW group acknowledges that they could reclassify these as territorial.40 This study will
classify Taiwan as a territorial dispute based on the ultimate goal of reunification.
The MID data also suggested that the PRC was the most violence-prone state. In a
variegated statistical analysis, the data showed that the PRC resorted to force more often, and at a
higher level of violence when force was used, than any other major power. Overall, "There has
been a fairly constant level of hostility and violence across Chinese [PRC] MIDs up to the end of
the 1980s."41
Johnston's general conclusions both support and contrast with what this study intends to
prove. In agreement, he stated that China is more dispute prone than most states and that these
disputes usually center on territorial questions. In contrast, he stated that when the PLA is
involved in disputes, it is more likely to use a higher level of violence than other states. While this
thesis does not compare the PRC with other states' behavior, it will demonstrate that China's use
of force is frequently over territorial questions but that it is typically limited in nature.
C. CHINA'S NATIONAL TERRITORY
Thus far the literature surveyed has only briefly touched upon one of the themes of this
work—the relationship between China's national territory and the PRC's willingness to use force.
The Chinese world view provided a construct with which to perceive Chinese actions and belief
systems. Within this purview, what does the literature say about Chinese history and views






A fundamental starting point is the traditional view that China has always perceived the
outside world from a uniquely Sinocentric position. The Chinese view of the Middle Kingdom as
the center of the civilized world, their hierarchical scheme of foreign relations, and their
assumption of superiority have all been well documented. 42 As Norton Ginsburg points out, what
made this state-centered position unique for China as opposed to other modern views of the state
was that "China possessed this view long before the modern European state had come into
existence."43 A distinct Asian view existed contrary to the Western ideal that state power
extended to the farthest reaches of the realm with the same efficacy as that which emanated from
the center. He writes:44
China's traditional view of her role in the world order did not place equal premium on all of her
territory, and also placed different value on territories beyond her actual control. . . .The
localization of power and authority was greatest in a core area and tapered off in all directions. . .
.
The spatial model that incorporates these conditions was composed of a series of overlapping,
merging concentric zones: each associated in somewhat different ways with the core; each
varying somewhat in their relations with the others as the power of the Chinese state waxed and
waned.
Paradoxically, Theodore Herman notes ancient texts which demonstrate "from very early
times [2000 B.C.] the historical records were concerned with the delineation of political areas."45
These records provide one of the earliest cosmographies of political geography and delineate the
country into five concentric domains: the Domain of the Sovereign, the Domain of the Nobles,
42
For a classical summary of this view, see John K. Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," in The
Chinese World Order: Traditional China 's Foreign Relations, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1968), 1-19.
43
Norton Ginsburg, "On the Chinese Perception of a World Order," in China in Crisis, Vol. 2, ed. Tang




Theodore Herman, "Group Values Toward the National Space: The Case of China," The Geographical
Review, VolXLIX. No. 2 (April 1959): 171.
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the Peace-Securing Domain, the Domain of Restraint, and finally the Wild Domain of the
barbarians.46 Herman's evidence does not disconfirm the concentric model but rather confirms
that the Chinese were aware of their system. Until the Europeans arrived with their ideas, the
Chinese simply had no reason to believe it was unique or that there was a different way of
constructing national and political areas of influence.
Like Fairbank and Ginsburg, Herman also points to the fluidity of the Chinese concept of
spatial territory.
47
The boundaries referred to above were not permanent. Chinese claims and actual possession
extended beyond [and within] for various periods, as with Mongolia, parts of Manchuria and
Korea, the Liuchiu Islands, and Formosa. Such extensions were of most concern to Chinese
living nearby or to those who traveled or were sent to these distant areas. But they became
important in a broad national sense when their seizure by other powers was regarded as an
assault on China 's existence as a culture and as a state [my emphasis].
. . . [Thus the] frontiers of China came to have a political and cultural meaning far greater than
their economic value, and it was against inroads from these frontiers that Chinese society
exercised its absorption technique persistency, though not always successfully.
Herein lies the key to China's perception of their national territory. Herman's analysis was
written only ten years after the birth of the People's Republic, but is basic to this study's attempt
to determine how the PRC perceived their frontiers and how much effort they were willing to
exert to protect or reassert their influence in them. The Chinese distinction of different values on
territory, the tidal flows of this value, and the heightened sense of value when threatened, all come
together to form a distinct, time-honored but fluid, Chinese concept of national territory and
boundary within which Chinese control and influence should reign supreme.






Table 4. Views of the Chinese Concentric Rings of Control/Influence























































Source: Author derived from Herman, 172; Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," 2,13; and Ginsburg, 76-79.
characterizing concentric Chinese rings of authority and influence emanating from the center.
1. Herman's Imperialist Dismemberment
Other than suggesting that the ancient tradition of concentric domains was passed down
for "millennia," Herman offers no new interpretations of the concept. Instead, he points to the
pecking away of Chinese territory and influence abroad under Western and Japanese imperial
powers from 1689-1945. He divides this diminution into six groups (see Figure 3), roughly by
area and method of change. They are central to understanding the Chinese perception of
humiliation and territorial dismemberment by the imperial powers.
2. Fairbank's Chinese Zones
Fairbank' s graded and concentric hierarchy of Chinese foreign relations included four
zones. In the center was the Middle Kingdom and extended outward with the Han people. The
28
1. Fixing of the border with Russia, largely by force or the threat of force. 1689-1881.
2. Detachment of Outer Mongolia by a local independence movement and aid from Russia, later the
USSR, 1911-1945.
3. In Manchuria, a constant shift of control and pressures by Russia. Japan, and the USSR. 1898-1952.
4. Along the coast a series of forcible concessions to rival powers, clustered in the north and south, 1557-
1945. No power seized the middle until the Japanese invasion, 1937-1945.
5. Countries to the south detached by the Western powers from political ties and tribute payments to
China, 1885-1912.
6. Fifty-two former treaty ports and three former leased territories, selected by various foreign powers for
commercial and strategic posts, gave foreigners many rights of residence, activity, and political
privilege, 1842-1945.
Figure 3. Alterations of Chinese Territory and Influence by the Imperial Powers
Source: Herman, 175. For a map corresponding to these losses of territory see Herman, 176.
second, which he described as the Sinic Zone, consisted of adjacent and culturally similar
tributaries including Korea, Vietnam, the Ryukyu Islands, and for brief periods Japan. The third,
Inner Asian Zone, consisted of tributary tribes and states of the nomadic peoples of Inner Asia
who were not only ethnically and culturally non-Chinese but were outside or on the periphery of
Chinese culture. The Outer Zone consisted of "outer barbarians" usually at great distances but
also eventually including Japan as well as states in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Europe. In
theory, all these non-Chinese states were expected to pay proper tribute to the Middle Kingdom.
Reality was far from theory, however. It was one of the great challenges, Fairbank's argues, for
China to reconcile the fact of non-submission within their Sinocentric paradigm.48
48
Preceding paragraph summarized from Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," 2-3. For an interesting
presentation on the types and means of China's relationships with these zones see ibid., 13.
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3. Ginsburg's Chinese Zones
At the center Ginsburg put China Proper and divided it into "Core" and the "Ecumene."
The "Core" were areas over which control was virtually continuous from Han times to the
present. The "Ecumene" were regions over which control was present but less effective. Next
was an irregular Inner Zone over which China, at certain periods, exerted nominal if not genuine
sovereignty. It included Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, Tibet, Korea, and Annam.
Periphery regions ranging from those territories actually held under Chinese suzerainty such as the
Trans-Amur territories and eastern parts of former Soviet Middle Asia to those which were
merely subordinate tributary states such as those extending from Afghanistan to the Ryukyus were
also in the Inner Zone. The Outer Asian Zone included areas running from Persia to India,
Southeast Asia, and Japan. These states, excluding Japan, had never really been in a full tributary
status, but were relatively well known to the Chinese. The last ring, the Foreign Zone or "The
Great Beyond," included the rest of the world.49
D. THE "CHINA THREAT THEORY"
Finally, a survey of the literature should include the so-called "China Threat Theory."
Indeed, it is the debate for and against this argument that most determines the current responses
and policies toward China. Moreover, both its proponents and opponents cite the PRC's (as well
as Imperial China's) past uses of force to support their arguments.
As Denny Roy suggests, "the China Threat argument maintains that an increasingly
49
Preceding paragraph derived summarized from Ginsburg, 76-79.
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powerful China is likely to destabilize regional security in the near future." 50 Proponents of a
China Threat argue that this destabilization will be fueled by a number of factors, namely the
PRCs rapid economic growth, military modernization, and unsatiated appetite for territorial
expansion and regional hegemony. The manifestations of such increased Chinese power will be in
the form of military assertiveness including an armed resolution of the Taiwan question. More
aggressive moves in the South and East China Seas can be expected. Increased Chinese
intransigence and even belligerence toward international efforts to get the PRC to follow accepted
norms such as World Trade Organization (WTO) trade standards, human rights practices, and
arms proliferation restrictions will become commonplace. The PRC will continue eschewing
multilateral dialogues and organizations that neutralize their power and influence vis-a-vis smaller
states.
In response to this perceived Chinese threat, an inflammatory essay in Time argued U.S.
policy should not only contain, but also "undermine" the communist regime. 51 A recent and
widely-read book, The Coming Conflict with China, describes the most dire of the China Threat
scenarios in which a Sino-U.S. war breaks out. 52 The authors depict a rising China bent on
regional hegemony and ultimately superpower status. Even Samuel Huntington, the highly
regarded political scientist, contributed to the frenzy with his book on the West's impending clash
50 Denny Roy, "The 'China Threat' Issue: Major Arguments," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVI, No. 8 (August
1996): 758. Up to its date of publication, this article (pp. 758-771) does an excellent job of objectively synthesizing
and articulating both arguments. There have been many more since; see below for just a few of these.
51
Charles Krauthammer, "Why We Must Contain China." Time, 31 July 1995, 72.
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Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Vintage Books,
1998).
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with the non-West. 53
The Chinese themselves are well aware of the China Threat debate but have not helped the
matter with such publications as China Can Say No and Can the Chinese Army Win the Next
War?54 Often these types of responses to American criticisms of China only serve to fan the
flames of trepidation and validate the original warnings of a threatening China, ultimately making
the original China Threat Theory a self-fulfilling prophecy. Officially, however, the Chinese are
careful not to provide more verbal fodder for the "anti-China crowd," and opt for more restrained
Chinese responses. A 1996 article argued that any supposed increased assertiveness implied in
the China Threat Theory is "untenable" because "history shows that China has rarely [emphasis
mine] waged war against other nations unless threatened on a large scale from the outside." It
goes on to say that the theory is "concocted for the purpose of containing China's
development."55
Roy lists several reasons why China should not be viewed as a threat. First, the PRC may
not be able to develop into a hegemon, even if it wanted to. There are simply too many political,
economic and military constraints to allow Chinese power to grow to such proportions. Second,
as the Chinese themselves like to point out, China has a benign history, even at times when it was
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1996).
China Can Say No-Political and Emotional Choices in the Post-Cold War Age (Beijing: China
Industry and Commerce Publishing House. 1996) by Song Qiang and others, was described by Si Cheng in Beijing
Review, 21-27 October 1996, 13, as "a strong Chinese voice opposing US power politics and hegemony." Another
controversial work was Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?, an internal document with unknown authors
who assert that China must seize the initiative in "the future military order" in order to prepare China for a
"sustained state of confrontation" with the U.S., cited in Bernstein and Munro, 33.
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Ren Xin, "'China Threat' Theory Untenable," Beijing Review, 05-11 February 1996, 10-1 1
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the dominant and unchallenged power in the region. Third, its military modernization is simply a
readjustment for decades of neglect and nothing more than its neighbors have done in the past
decade. Fourth, the "anti-threat'" crowd argues that those against China fear an Asian resurgence
led by China and a concomitant decline in Western (especially American; power and influence:
they argue the China Threat Theory is merely a way of fanning the flames of hostility toward
China.5* Moreover, there are those in the U.S. (the authors of The Coming Conflict With China
2iz prototypical; who are too quick to demonize China and thus fmd a successor strategic threat
for the U.S. that disappeared with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This author would add to
this list the economic imperatives of China which may make increased assertiveness not propitious
for the near future. In addition, the Chinese have begun to play the race and culture card in their
counterattacks against the China Threat theorists. The Chinese feel they are being unfairly judged
against Western values and point to "neo-racism and neo-colonialism in Western countries" in
which ''white values are the universal gauge."5
The China Threat Theory has led to an increasing polarization of views vis-a-vis the PRC.
The most compelling disagreement between the two sides of the spectrum is how a rejuvenated
China will use its strength. Fundamentally, the China Threat argument is a contemporary
discourse on the strategic culture of China, its expanding power and presence in global affairs,
and the potential for conflict, military or otherwise, with competing states. The understanding of




Shi Yinhon Against China." and Li Xiguang. "US Media; Behind the Demonization of
China." Beijing Review, 21-2" October 1996. 11-12.
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interpreted. Consequently, the world and especially the U.S. will be well served to understand the
causal links to the PRC use of force.
E. CONCLUSION
A common theme appears to run through each of the studies reviewed here. The PRC
views the use of force in resolving foreign policy disputes more favorably than conventionally
believed. At the least, as Johnston argues, the data suggests "that there should be some
skepticism towards the conventional wisdom" 58 that views China as conforming to the Confucian-
Mencian tradition. Indeed, an alternative school has already formed that advocates viewing
Chinese and PRC history as more bellicose than pacifist. The most vehement and alarmist of this
school is represented by the China Threat Theorists who warn against the excesses of a resurgent
China. The PRC has been quick to mobilize their own verbal counterattack against the China
Threat Theory and have pulled out the standard verbiage of a benign China which only desires
"'peaceful co-existence."
The survey also revealed the origins of the PRC's world view. Imperial China was deeply
embedded with a Sinocentric hierarchical view of foreign relations that manifested itself in subject
and tributary status for all those states within China's reach. The result was a concentric ring of
overlapping control and influence that waxed, waned, and varied in importance with the strength
of the Chinese state. Each view presented, remarkably even the 4000-year old one, varied only
slightly. Juxtaposed against the strength of the state, Chinese strategic frontiers determine the
territorial limits to which they are willing to use force for foreign policy objectives.
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Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior,'" 28.
34
HI. CASE STUDY PARAMETERS
The battle lines have been drawn between advocates of a traditionally benign China and
those who see an historically aggressive China. For any observer of China, one must determine
which is valid, both from an historical and contemporary context. As the survey of literature
suggests, older writing favors a peaceful benign China based on its Confucian-Mencian heritage.
However, more recent studies have begun to distinguish a non-pacifist tradition described as a
parabellum paradigm. This perspective has perhaps culminated in the China Threat Theory-. Yet,
none of the studies fully addressed the purpose of this thesis—to examine trends in PRC conflict
and crisis behavior with a special focus on the Chinese concept of sovereignty and their national
strategic frontiers. Such a focus can aid in determining why and where the PRC will use force. A
theoretical framework must therefore be established in order to analyze the historical data
presented for this study. The parameters outlined in this chapter will facilitate and guide the case
study discussion and analysis.
A. SOVEREIGNTY ABSOLUTISM
Sovereignty has proven to be the most fundamental element of Chinese foreign policy
since 1949. Indeed, it is a concept which they use perhaps more frequently than any other in their
security policy.
59 Added to the variable of "territorial integrity," to which the Chinese also
consistently refer, their concept of sovereignty is a very volatile and contentious issue.
While not ancient, the Chinese idea of sovereignty has deep roots. It could be more aptly
' In their latest Defense White Paper, the Chinese use the word or forms of the word "sovereignty" no
less than fifteen times. "White Paper-China's National Defense." released 27 July 98 by the Information Office of
the State Council of the PRC. Source obtained online from [http://www.china-embassy.orgl.
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described as deep scars—scars from humiliation and territorial dismemberment during their
"century of shame." Their anxiety and mistrust of foreign intrusion and interference are
predominantly based on the treatment China received from the imperial powers. These feelings
still significantly shape their security policy. 60 Deng Xiaoping said, "The sovereignty and security
of the country should always come first. . .there is no room for maneuver for China."61 A senior
PLA officer wrote of the "sovereignty of exercising independence" as "the essential symbol of a
nation being an independent entity, while security if the precondition of the survival and
development of a nation. Therefore, sovereignty and security should be placed ahead of all other
national interests."62
One manifestation of this type of thinking is what Johnston calls "hyper-sovereignty."63 I
prefer to call the PRC approach to this issue "sovereignty absolutism." Sovereignty absolutism is
defined here as the inflexible or nearly inflexible policy of a state whose paramount security
consideration is the undisputed (free from external) control and influence within its borders. The
}
For a view on how the PLA and presumably the entire PRC security establishment perceives these
issues see Li Jijun, LTG, PLA, "Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China," 29 August
1997, address at the United States War College, obtained online at [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/
pubs97/china/chinapl.htm]. He also speaks of the unequal treaties forced upon China before 1949 costing them
1 .8 million square kilometers of Chinese territory. "This was a period of humiliation the Chinese people can never
forget. This is why the people of China show such strong emotions concerning our national independence, unity,
integrity of territory and sovereignty. This is also why the Chinese are so determined to safeguard them under
any circumstances and at all costs" [my emphasis].
61 Deng quoted in Hong Bin, "Deng Xiaoping' s Perspective on National Interest," in Chinese Views of
Future Warfare, ed. Michael Pillsbury (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997), 34-35.
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Ibid., 33.
According to Johnston hyper-sovereignty is a description based on a realpolitik foreign policy in which
PRC elite struggle to reconcile its concepts of "majorpowerhood" power status symbols with the external,
institutional and normative constraints on Chinese behavior. See Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute
Behavior," 2.
36
PRC follows this model. For the PRC there are two corollaries. First, there exist varying degrees
of PRC influence that should be received or acquiesced to by China's neighbors. Traditionally,
acquiescent regions have included much of non-Han East Asia, Southeast Asia, and parts of
Central Asia. Second, the CCP, as the standard bearer of the revived Chinese state, is the sole
proprietor of sovereignty within the PRC. Any threat toward the Party is considered a threat to
Chinese sovereignty. The inflexibility refers to the willingness of the PRC to protect these
sovereign rights of control and influence "at all costs."
Thus, for the PRC there exists a dual concept of sovereignty that extends from territorial
to influential. Subsequently, the PRC's notion of sovereignty versus the typical Western ideal is
somewhat different. Sovereignty is defined in the Western sense as the "freedom from external
control" or as "controlling influence."64 Like the Western definition, the Chinese interpret
sovereignty as the ability to govern its own citizens without foreign influence or attempts at
influence. However, the Chinese focus on influence much more acutely than is typical from a
Western perspective. The Chinese also implicitly demand influence in regions outside the
territorial borders of the PRC. This influence, from the Chinese perspective, should encompass all
the areas that have historically been under the suzerainty of the Chinese people plus areas that
have traditionally been dominated by Chinese culture. By design, this is a vague concept. The
Chinese prefer it that way. Ambiguity provides an intellectual and legalistic protective blanket in
times of Chinese weakness while simultaneously providing flexibility in times of Chinese strength.
As the strength of the nation expands and contracts, so does their definition and application of
64




The key terms are control and influence. The Chinese want both. Indeed, in practice they
maintain three concepts of sovereignty: control over their own territory, influence over areas
perceived to be within the Chinese sphere, and freedom from foreign influence in either of the two
previous areas. The mere interference of foreign powers in Chinese policy within its perceived
sphere of influence is considered a violation of Chinese sovereignty. Exactly where this perceived
sphere of influence has been at any given time is difficult to establish. This brings up the question
of sovereignty versus suzerainty. The Chinese have been extraordinarily successful in convincing
various constituencies throughout the world that where they once had suzerainty, they now
deserve sovereignty. Obviously, the extent of their success is arguable, but one only needs to
study the evolution of the term Greater China (see below) to recognize that a de facto expansion
of Chinese sovereignty has taken place—even without the direct involvement of the PRC.
Regardless, the Chinese use the term flexibly, often merely as a crutch to call upon when
threatened by foreign powers. The PRC has found that citing sovereignty is an extremely
effective tactic when dealing with contentious issues and claims in the international community.
Now let us examine the terms that will be used to discuss this relationship between
sovereignty, security and the use of force. Listed below are my definitions, which generally
coincide with, but do not mirror, Ginsburg's zone of control and influence (see Table 4). Vis-a-
vis territorial security, the Chinese define a threat to their sovereignty in three areas.
1. Core China
"Core China" can be described as the areas under direct administrative control by the
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Qing dynasty. 65 Generally not included are Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang),
Tibet, and-conspicuously-Taiwan. Another variation of Core China is "China Proper." But due
to the ambiguity this term represents in light of the PRC territory now legitimately claimed and
internationally recognized, I have chosen the term Core China over China Proper.
The importance of Core China in this study is that it is the area least fought over. More
precisely, it has not been fought over with a foreign power since 1945. Interrelated with the
Chinese ability to legitimate and legally incorporate its Greater China claims into the People's
Republic (for example: Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia), the expansion of their strategic frontier
has enabled them to defend the country beyond the gates of Core China and out into the
periphery.
2. Greater China
As David Shambaugh puts it, "Greater China is largely an informal phenomenon, lacking
institutionalization."66 The term itself is a controversial one because it conjures up evil
representations of "Greater" that were used by Japan (Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)
and Germany (Greater Reich and lebensraum) during the Second World War. Indeed, articles
published in the Liberation Army Daily, the PLA's newspaper, argued for an expansion of
China's ground, sea, and air strategic frontiers for "living space" for the Chinese people.67
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David Shambaugh, "Introduction: The Emergence of 'Greater China,'" The China Quarterly, No. 136
(December 1993): 655.
Xu Guangyu, "Pursuit of Equitable Three Dimensional Strategic Boundaries," Jiefangjunbao, 03 April
1987, 3; referenced in David Shambaugh, "The Insecurity of Security: The PLA's Evolving Doctrine and Threat
Perceptions Towards 2000," Journal ofNortheast Asian Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Spring 1994): 15.
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Greater China subsumes three relatively distinct themes: economic integration, cultural
interaction and political reunification with the international Chinese community. 68 This study's
analysis focuses on the last of the three which is often the final manifestation of the first two. The
impact and coercive pressure of economic integration and cultural interaction often shape and
legitimize the potential political framework of Greater China. The political connotation of
Greater China refers to the expansion of the PRC's boundaries to include territory formerly under
its control during various periods of Chinese history. Due to the historic tributary relationship
China had with its neighbors, China can link suzerainty with sovereignty when convenient or when
national power allows such linkage. Similarly, China's diaphragm-like strategic frontier expands
and contracts with the strength of the nation and allows extension to the areas referred to as
Greater China. The concept of strategic frontier will be discussed below in more detail.
The history of the term Greater China dates as far back as the 1930s, but the concept
directly stems from the term "Chinese Empire" which itself included "China Proper" and "Outer
China."69 Beginning in the 1970s, the concept of Greater China has grown as the economic
impact of Deng's Open Door Policy expanded Chinese influence in the region. By the mid-1990s
the term had extended in breadth to be increasingly used as political lexicon describing:
1. Core China
2. Areas previously incorporated into the PRC including Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner
Mongolia
3. Areas eventually to be incorporated into the PRC including Hong Kong (acceded
?
Harry Harding, "The Concept of 'Greater China': Themes, Variations and Reservations," The China




1997), Macao (to be acceded in 1999), and Taiwan (reunification still debatable but generally
assumed it will occur)
4. Areas still in contention with other states including the Paracel (Xisha) Islands, Spratly
(Nansha) Islands, Diaoyutai Islands, and various other maritime claims in the East and South
China Seas
There are limits to Greater China, but they almost certainly depend on a Chinese
willingness to use the term to describe only the most obvious—mainland China (including
Xinjiang and Tibet), Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and a few legitimately claimed offshore islands.
More importantly, however, the term's limitations depend on the willingness of the international
community to hold the PRC to a narrowly defined concept of Greater China. Scholarly
conferences have convened to debate the issue and have essentially expanded the definitions of the
term. The debate allowed what in the past has been regarded as "Maritime China" to be included
in Greater China. In addition, overseas ethnic Chinese have been included as well. 70 The
extended claim of Maritime China is based on centuries-old forays of Chinese explorers and
emissaries of the emperor best exemplified by Zhen He's expeditions in the 15th century. The
implicit scholarly acceptance of Maritime China as part of Greater China has been a boon to
present and future Chinese expansionists and in effect gave them significant legitimacy to
Shambaugh, "The Emergence of 'Greater China,'" 654. Shambaugh describes a 03-05 January 1993
debate in Hong Kong hosted by The China Quarterly over the term "Greater China." At first considered "too
vague, too pejorative and implying expansionism" the conferees initially were leaning to dropping the term
altogether but eventually reached a "consensus" and added overseas Chinese. While the inclusion of overseas
Chinese could have serious implications in several countries especially in Southeast Asia, the ability of the PRC to
influence or claim these citizens as their own will always be regulated by the citizenship ethnic Chinese hold in
their country of residence and consequently that country's legitimate authority over them. However, the extension
to maritime claims has no such limiting factor since most of what could be included under Chinese sovereignty are
disputed but uninhabited islands and reefs in the South and East China Seas. Also see Stephen Uhalley, Jr., "Hong
Kong and 'Greater China,'" Pacific Rim Report, No. 5 (July 1997) which is a revised version of the keynote
address from another conference on Greater China held at the University of San Francisco on 17-18 April 1997.
From a more economic perspective but no less significant, Uhalley also adds Maritime China to his definition of
Greater China.
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reinforce Chinese claims to areas such as the Paracel and Spratly Islands. 71 Despite these trends, I
have chosen not to recognize Maritime China as part of Greater China because it is a relatively
recent phenomenon and there are simply too many overlapping and contested claims to recognize
any single state as the rightful owner of these islands. Instead, I classify Maritime China as part of
the PRC's regional sovereignty claims.
3. Regional
Regional sovereignty is a term the Chinese rarely state explicitly but often imply and is
very much based on Chinese perceptions. 72 Throughout PRC history, the Chinese used
sovereignty to lay claim to areas that covered the above definitions of Core China and Greater
China. But they have also used sovereignty as a justification to enter conflicts beyond their
recognized borders. Whether the justification involved the threat of superpower intrusion or a
reassertion of traditional Chinese influence, this type of "regional sovereignty" most aptly
identifies China's expansionist tendencies over the past fifty years.
During the Mao era the struggle against first U.S. and later Soviet "social imperialism"
substituted for regional sovereignty. Imperialism was a sensitive and convenient term that
conjured up China's past humiliation at the hands of the Western powers and Japan. 73 However,
71
The jump from a "scholarly" Greater China to a "political" Greater China should not be overlooked.
The PRC generally refers to Greater China as the Motherland, a term with less derogatory connotations. They are
essentially the same thing. For an example see Jiang Zemin, "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the
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See Arthur Huck's The Security of China: Chinese Approaches to Problems ofWar and Strategy (New
York; Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 8-12 for reproductions of the pictograph "American Imperialism's
Military Encirclement of China" and the "Map of the Excellent World Situation" from the People 's Daily 29
January 1966 and 26 September 1968, respectively. The former shows China surrounded by American military
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it meant much more than that. The struggle against imperialism was also a struggle to prevent
further erosion of Chinese power and to initiate a reassertion of the traditional levels of Chinese
influence in Asia.
Later, the term hegemony replaced imperialism as the euphemism used by the PRC to
label those powers that threatened or supplanted Chinese influence in the region. 74 Today, while
they still aim the term hegemon at the U.S., they also indirectly aim it at U.S. allies in the region.
Japan and Korea are perceived as co-conspirators in a hegemonic bloc to contain China. 75 Thus,
the Chinese perceive a form of regional sovereignty that encompasses both their ability to exert
their influence in the region as well as other states' efforts or perceived efforts at supplanting
Chinese influence. This type of sovereignty is more inferential than the direct type of sovereignty
which Core China and Greater China describe. Nevertheless, the PRC's words and actions
indicate an extension of their sovereignty to areas beyond their borders has often been an
important factor in their decision to use force. Within the last fifty years national interests based
on regional claims of sovereignty, more aptly described as Chinese influence, represent some of
might from Hokkaido to Thailand while the latter shows the disintegration of the "imperialist bloc" around the
globe.
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While I cannot place a precise time and author of the switch, sometime in the early 1970s Chinese
literature seems to have replaced imperialism with hegemony as the label applied to foreign powers threatening to
China While the significance of this semantic shift should not be overstated, a likely impetus for the change was
to allow an easier reconciliation with the U.S. and condemnation of the Soviets. The term hegemon allows the
Chinese to turn on and off their derision of specific countries by labeling them with "hegemonic intentions" rather
than the historically enduring negative connotation that "imperialist" implies.
A remarkably balanced 1996 article in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 16 January 1996, translated in
FBIS-CHI-96-014, reviewed a New York Times article entitled "The Third American Empire." Without directly
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the most important factors in the PRC decision to use force.
B. DESCRIPTION OF TERMS
As stated, this thesis will attempt to discern patterns in PRC conflict behavior vis-a-vis
their perceptions of sovereignty and their strategic frontier. In that context, the case studies will
examine several issues including:
1
.
The justification for the threat and/or use of force (both implicit and explicit) by the
PRC
2. The type of force used by the PRC
3. Whether or not territorial concerns were pre-eminent in the PRC decision to use force
4. The type of sovereignty/regional influence perceived by the PRC to be threatened
5. The extent to which the PRC strategic frontier was shifting to meet the threat
1. Justification
Justification refers to the PRC explanation of the danger that warranted the initial threat
and/or use of force to achieve security objectives. The analysis includes any justification for
escalation after initial hostilities began. Explicit justifications cited by the Chinese to the
international community are typically propaganda for both foreign and domestic consumption and
may or may not have matched the actual or implicit reasons PRC leaders felt compelled to use
force for security objectives. Implicit justifications are often difficult to determine due to the lack
of transparency in CCP decision-making processes. However, the true reasons for using force
often can be derived from interpreting thinly veiled references in PRC official statements.
2. Force Used/Method
The amount of force used by the PLA in the past is an important consideration in
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determining how they might react in the future. The number of troops committed signifies the
degree of effort the PRC is willing to commit to achieve its foreign policy goals by force. Force
level also provides a means of controlling the conflict though limitation or expansion. The
method with which force is used or threatened also provides insight into how a state will respond
to specific types of threats.
The Force/Used Method category is divided into two parts: the numbers of PLA personnel
involved in the conflict and the method by which they were employed. I divide the first part into
four categories: 76 limited, moderate, substantial, and total. The numbers of PLA troops involved
is considered limited if less than 50,000 men. Between 50,000 and 500,000 men is considered
moderate, while greater than 500,000 troops involved is considered substantial. While I included
"total war" as a conflict category, the People's Republic has yet to be engaged in such a conflict
since they expelled the Nationalists from the mainland, which essentially predates the period
analyzed in this study.
The method with which force was employed is used to determine the incrementalism of
Chinese deterrence posture and force escalation/de-escalation. I simply categorize the methods as
incremental or non-incremental. An additional identifier of risk acceptant may be added to these
two descriptions.
Limited information exists of PRC top-level decision-making regarding the use of force.
However, the methods of deterrence and the escalation level of a crisis/conflict can be observed
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For a theoretical discussion of the degree of force concept see "Scale of the Military Objective and of
the Effort To Be Made;" Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 585-594. In my use of the term "total war,' numbers are not
necessarily (but could be in the case of a complete mobilization of society for a conventional war) significant since
a nuclear exchange of any sort could be considered 'total war.'
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through pre-crisis warning signals and actions respectively. Methods of deterrence included
public statements of warning such as the famous "cannot sit idly by" used by the Chinese prior to
both the Korean and Indian conflicts. PRC actions are more easily observed than deterrence
signals, but the lack of primary source material also inhibits this interpretation.
It is generally assumed here that incremental uses of force are those involving military
engagement, followed by a pause in the intensity and effort of battle, and then a subsequent
increase (or decrease) in the force level and engagement. The PRC response after the lull in battle
is based on two components: (1) to provide the opportunity for the opponent to respond, and (2)
a pause to allow an escalation or de-escalation of the conflict based on the first criterion. Non-
incremental is the absence of clearly registered pauses and progressive changes in PRC crisis and
conflict behavior. 77
The importance of this distinction between incremental and non-incremental approaches to
crises or conflicts is the existence or nonexistence of an escalation control/escalatory relief valve.
A control/relief valve offers a relatively easy means of diminishing the level of force or threats
used without overly jeopardizing national interests or prestige. Examples of controlling the
escalation of a conflict include limiting it to a small geographical area or limiting the type of
weapons employed such as tanks, aircraft, artillery. 78 The PRC used these and other types of
The preceding paragraph is based on a discussion of "conflict" incrementalism. Depending on the
applicability within each case-study, pre-conflict or "crisis" incrementalism may also be discussed. In this case,
add "threats" to "use of force/military engagement," substitute "battle" with "crisis interaction" and substitute
"force level and engagement" with "deterrent signals."
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In addition to limited troop and force levels Chan discusses other Chinese methods of conflict
escalation control measures. He describes a "variety of detente measures" including "unilateral cease fires, troop
disengagements, proposals for conflict negotiation [that] are usually applied immediately after each series of
military operations. They provide escape hatches for both China and its adversary. ..." See Chan, "Chinese
Conflict Calculus," 408.
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escalation control measures to prevent a conflict from getting out of hand or losing too much
prestige in case things went badly. Pauses and gradations in diplomacy or conflict enable the PRC
to implement a flexible policy that would otherwise be impossible once they had pulled the trigger
toward conflict.
Finally, the identifier of "risk acceptant" may be applied to either method. It is understood
that any use of force implies a certain acceptance of national risk. But here it describes methods
which the PRC neglected to consider or deemed it worth the risk of using force against an
adversary with far greater military capability. Similarly, risk acceptant also describes cases in
which the PRC believed the use of force was worth the expected backlash to be received from
non-belligerents and transnational organizations. Presumably, in such cases the PRC understood
it was placing itself in an extremely unfavorable position if things did not go well on the battlefield
or the bargaining table. A scenario in which the negative implications simply were not considered
by the PRC would be extremely hard to prove. Thus, the risk acceptant label will rely exclusively
on the assumption that the PRC was aware of and willing to accept the risk that diplomatic or
military failure might bring.
3. Sovereignty/Strategic Frontier
The three levels of sovereignty have already been discussed in detail. The strategic
frontier was described above as a diaphragm-like extension of Chinese boundaries (both territorial
and influential) that expands and contracts with the strength of the nation. Shambaugh more
specifically describes strategic frontiers as "a concept in security studies that attempts to delineate
the territorial parameters of a nation's national security interests, i.e., territories to which it would
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be willing to commit military forces in pursuit of goals."79
The fluctuating zones of control and influence of Imperial China have already been
discussed in detail. The People's Republic is no different. As the state has matured, it too, has
seen its zones of influence (if not control) change. Where it perceives these zones to be and
where it would be willing to use force to protect or exert its interests in these areas is important
for interpreting the past as well as understanding the future. The PRC's concept of its strategic
frontier during conflict management is best divided into three categories: status-quo, traditional,
and expanding. Status-quo represents a maintenance of the current strategic frontier that is
within the legitimate, or legitimately disputed, boundaries of the PRC.80 It is neither an assertion
over historical areas of influence beyond PRC boundaries nor an expansion of the existing
strategic frontier. The two case study examples of a status-quo strategic frontier (India- 1962 and
the USSR- 1969) were instances of maintaining control over PRC-held territory (disputed with the
USSR) and the disputed North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) territory which both the PRC and
India claimed but neither side permanently held. A "traditional" strategic frontier represents an
attempt to return or protect historic areas of territorial control or influence. From a non-Chinese
79
Shambaugh, "The Insecurity of Security," 14.
80
Legitimate boundaries refers to de jure and recognized boundaries by the international community as
well as PRC neighbors. Legitimately disputed boundaries refers to specific sectors where international boundaries
have yet to be delimited and recognized by all concerned parties. PRC examples include the Sino-Vietnam border,
the Sino-Indian border, and various locations along the Sino-Russian border. In these cases, neither side
recognizes the other's claim, but each has also elected to remain with the status-quo until de jure demarcation can
occur. Crisis and conflict occur when the status-quo is rejected.
Johnston's comments on status-quo powers (though not necessarily ones with status-quo strategic frontiers) are
interesting. He writes, "A (self-perceived) status-quo power could use highly coercive, expansionist means in a
conservative, restorationist effort to eliminate rising threats to its hegemony," Johnston, Cultural Realism. 111.
Likewise, a power that defended traditional interests through a punitive attack could also be considered
expansionist.
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perspective, a traditional strategic frontier could be perceived as expansionist. As will be
demonstrated, however, a traditional strategic frontier implies the willingness of the PRC to use
force to protect national interests in areas that the Chinese nation has pursued throughout its
history—most notably Taiwan, but also Tibet, Korea and Vietnam. An expanding strategic
frontier is an attempt by the PRC to incorporate new areas previously not identified or recognized
within the Chinese orbit. These areas represent a fundamental shift in PRC strategic interests





The case study sections are divided into two sub-sections. A general description of
events will precede an analysis based on the parameters outlined in Chapter m. Specifically,
PRC justification for using force, the amount and method with which they used force, territorial
considerations, PRC sovereignty claims, and the PRC's strategic frontier will be analyzed. It
should be stated at the outset that I do not try to explain or analyze all the variables which
affected Chinese decision-making prior to and during the use of force. To do so would be
virtually impossible with such a large sample. At any rate, it is well beyond the scope of this
study.
When it is deemed significant to the overall decision-making process, the analysis will
contain discussion of other variables. Notably, I do not consider domestic political factors such
as internal bureaucratic or personal power struggles. Nor do I focus on the impetus domestic
crises at home may have contributed to the use of force abroad. Concerning the former (internal
bureaucratic or personal power struggles), it is still undetermined how much of an influence these
issues have had in the PRC's decisions to use force. Whiting as well as Gurtov and Hwang
lament the inadequacy of information. 81 Segal concluded that institutional biases and domestic
politics had determining but not deciding effects. 82 Johnston used only empirical data for his
1
Whiting, Chinese Calculus ofDeterrence, xv; Gurtov and Hwang, 2. This remains relatively true today.
While more information is becoming available into the decision making processes of PRC elites, the analysis is still
very speculative. It is still intellectually hazardous to make conclusions based on such specious information. Other
works have also minimized the effects of domestic politics on China's foreign policy. See Jianwei Wang, "Coping
with China as a Rising Power," in Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China, ed. James Shinn (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996), 133-174.
1
Segal concludes that "institutions need to be understood, but seem to have little direct impact on
Chinese policy," 238. Domestic policy links to foreign policy are evaluated on two levels. He states that despite the
51
analysis and did not delve into other variables outside the Correlates of War data group. 83 My
intention is not to imply that other variables not considered here are nonexistent or insignificant,




Little is known about PLA operations in Tibet. It is known that the PLA moved into
Tibet on 7 October 1950. Despite fighting and marching on the "roof of the world," the Chinese
were able to defeat the small number of Tibetan troops positioned around Qamdo by 19 October.
Qamdo was one of only a few battles during the entire campaign. 84 Movement was arduous.
Roads had to be built as they were used. Settling into their Qamdo bivouac, the PLA made few
moves beyond the town and instead waited for a political settlement. Their use of force was
intended to bring Tibetans to the bargaining table, and within a year it had succeeded. 85 The
Dalai Lama had fled Yatung but a Tibetan delegation signed a Seventeen-Point Agreement on 23
May 1951 which essentially "retura[ed Tibet] to the big family of the Motherland—the People's
apparent link to the PRC use of force and domestic turmoil, "There is little evidence to support the opposing notion
that China uses force in foreign policy to deflect internal dissent," 254. The second level, factional political
infighting between PRC civilian and military elite, is recognized. However, the "cleavages of power were varied
and often changed during the same crisis." Subsequently, "no neat and coherendy consistent lines of factional
argument" can be made, 255.
83
Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992," 1-30.
The is an extreme paucity of objective Western analysis of this conflict. Most Western descriptions
tend toward sensationalism and extreme bias against Communist China. One source that fits this pattern but also
examines PRC strategic interests and military considerations in Tibet is A. H. Stanton Candlin's monograph Tibet at
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The two most repeated justifications the Chinese used in invading Tibet were "to liberate
the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China."87 Neither were very credible. The Tibetan
people desired no such "liberation" from the Chinese nor did they represent any military threat to
China. The perceived threat from "the aggressive influence of British and American
imperialism,"88 was little more than anxiety over an Indian commonwealth tied to Britain and
paranoid delusions that the Chinese Nationalists, with American help, would open a second front
in Tibet. The lesser stated but most likely reason for PRC invasion was the consolidation and
unification of Greater China. Tibet had tributary ties to China at least as far back as the Ming
Dynasty. By the early 18th century (Qing Dynasty) China had again solidified suzerainty over
Tibet. 89
With only 30,000 PLA troops committed90 , China's opportunistic takeover of Tibet was
limited in nature. It was also relatively cautious. It entailed little risk with a world focused on
the Cold War turning hot in Korea and seemingly approaching that in Europe. Encouraged by
Beijing, peaceful attempts at reunification preceded and continued throughout sporadic PLA-
Quoted from Point 1 of the agreement. Cited in Candlin, 17.
87
Segal, 83.
Quote from Chinese general commanding troops in the region. Cited in Candlin, 12.
Fairbank, 219-222. Attempting to cite a "weakness of Chinese claims to influence in Tibetan affairs,"
Candlin nevertheless admits to "Chinese" influence in Tibet as far back as the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty, 9.
90
Segal, 84. Note, Candlin states there were 50,000 PLA troops involved, 13.
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Tibetan engagements. The seizure of Tibet was for completely territorial ends and was
considered the first step toward reunifying Greater China and returning the PRC strategic frontier
to more traditional boundaries. In words that would become increasingly familiar regarding
China's irredentist claims, the Chinese stated in a secret cable to India: 91
Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory, the problem of Tibet is entirely a domesuc
problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet to liberate the Tibetan
people and defend the borders of China. . .No foreign influence will be tolerated in Tibet. ...
In 1949 the PRC began warning to Tibet to enter negotiations on the political future of the PRC-
Tibet relationship. While military preparations proceeded simultaneously, diplomatic pressure
on Tibet continued. However, Tibetan foot-dragging on the matter eventually led to the end of
Beijing's patience. 92 Thus, even in this first use of force, there was both political and military
incrementalism in PRC behavior.
B. KOREAN WAR (1950-1953)
1. Description
On the evening of 19 October 1950 Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River into the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK-North Korea). In an effort to put PLA regulars
into Korea without giving the U.S. justification to expand the war, the PLA soldiers who entered
North Korea were known collectively as the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). Within six
days they had counterattacked South Korean forces inflicting heavy casualties. Within eight
months they had launched five offensive campaigns against the UN forces before settling down
1
Chandlin, 15. India was serving as an intermediary between the Tibetans and Chinese. Much of the





to a stalemate along the 38 th Parallel. The most notable instance in the PRC's use of military
force, the "War to Resist America and Aid Korea," is also the standard by which all subsequent
Chinese uses of the PLA have been measured. Likewise, the Chinese also view this war as their
most important. They learned numerous lessons from the war, but most significantly, discovered
the limitations of Chinese power. 93
Even before the Inchon landing Mao was the biggest proponent of entry into the war. He
was forced to convince and later squelch opposition, however. 94 PRC interest in the DPRK-
ROK (Republic of Korea) "civil war" was not even evident in military, economic or political
actions until Zhou Enlai telegraphed the UN on 20 August 1950 and "officially declared the PRC
an interested party."95 From there, PRC military preparations began in earnest while limited
political deterrence failed miserably. Warnings to the U.S. through India that China "will not sit
still and do nothing" while UN forces crossed the 38 th parallel in pursuit of the routed DPRK
3
For a more detailed discussion of Chinese lessons drawn from the Korean War see Bin Yu. "What




See Chen Jian, China 's Road to the Korean War (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1998), 153
and Shu Guang Zhang, Mao 's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KA:
University Press of Kansas, 1995), 80-81 . Mao"s biggest military opponent to intervention was his best field
commander from the Civil War, Marshall Lin Biao, who refused to command the CPV. Mao placed Marshall Peng
Dehuai in his stead.
Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, vi. Note, Chen Jian disputes Whiting's interpretation that
preparations were not underway for intervention earlier than Zhou's announcement. Instead, he argues that Mao
had convinced his CCP comrades earlier in August that an intervention in Korea was ultimately going to be
necessary. The UN perimeter around Pusan was looking as if it would hold and provide a springboard for a
counteroffensive against DPRK troops. Thus, according to Jian, Mao ordered acceleration of preparations that had
begun in July with die establishment of the Northeast Border Defense Army (NEBDA) to be effected toward
eventual intervention. The NEBDA was later renamed the CPV. See Chen Jian, China 's Road to the Korean War.
135-147 and n. 61 (pp. 271-272).
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forces did nothing to restrain U.S. actions. 96
Chinese objectives changed throughout the war. The changes resulted from an expansion
of original goals and then a disjuncture between political ends and military means. Early
successes of the First and Second Campaigns led to an increase in Chinese expectations that
resulted in an expansion of political goals without the military means to achieve them. The
Chinese shifted their political objective from deterrence of U.S. expansion north of the 38th
parallel to a complete victory and expulsion of the UN from the peninsula. 97 After the failure of
the Fifth Campaign in mid- 1951, a stalemate ensued, and the PRC reverted to a deterrence policy
of keeping U.S. forces below the parallel.
2. Analysis
Mao's decision in early October 1950 to enter the war in Korea was based on his fear of
facing a unified Korean puppet-state of the U.S. Initial CPV engagements were specifically
designed to avoid U.S. troops and were halted after less than two weeks of fighting to determine
the UN response and allow for reorganization and resupply of CPV troops. Mao was well aware
that crossing the Yalu involved great risk. From a strategic position, however, he felt it was
necessary. With an American foothold on the continent, China would be further encircled (the
Philippines, Indochina, and Taiwan were the other barriers). The U.S. and its allies would be




For an alternative view see Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for
Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992): 147-
153. Christensen argues that Mao's original goal was to push the U.S7UN forces off the peninsula. Regardless of
when Mao determined to intervene, his basic justification for entering the war remained the same.
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possibly three fronts. The long-term economic drain that sustained defensive forces along these
frontiers would more than outweigh the expected short-term effects that intervention would have
on rebuilding the shattered Chinese economy. PRC intervention was a gamble that the vastly
superior technology, firepower, and organization of the U.S. would not crush the CPV and move
across the Yalu themselves. The potential of U.S. nuclear weapons, despite Chinese assertions
otherwise, was a constant threat and convinced Mao that China needed them as well. However,
Mao felt the strength of the U.S./UN forces could be overcome due to weaknesses of a "long and
cumbersome supply line, insufficient manpower, low morale, domestic opposition, and disunity
among allies."98 Expected support from the Soviet Union would also aid the Chinese. For Mao,
the avoidance of "a situation that would be very unfavorable to the whole East" was well worth
the costs and risks of intervention."
The initial force of 300,000 men that flowed south over the Yalu gradually increased to
over a half-million men. The early attempts to limit direct combat with the U.S. troops enabled a
pause to allow a U.S. response to Chinese intervention. Instead of a reconsideration of their
advance on the Yalu, the Americans responded with MacArthur's "Home by Christmas"
offensive. The pause in CPV intensity and effort of battle after the First Campaign was broken
by MacArthur's drive and then culminated in another Chinese increase in effort with its Second
Campaign which forced the U.S./UN forces back to the 38th parallel. Subsequent campaigns




Cable from Mao Zedong to Joseph Stalin, 2 October 1950, quoted in Chen Jian, China 's Road to the
Korean War, 175-177.
59
The decision by Mao to enter the war was primarily a political decision and not a
perceived territorial threat to China. 100 To be sure, the territorial threat was present, but even
Mao's encirclement fear was primarily based on political and ideological rather than territorial
concerns. His cable to Stalin confirms this view as evidenced by his "unfavorable situation"
comment. Even Mao's worst case scenario was a PRC-U.S. war that would only result in a
limited conflict with desultory attacks by the U.S. on the Chinese periphery. Rather, the Chinese
entry into the war was to prevent the loss of one of its traditional regions of influence to an
imperialist United States and prevent the containment of the PRC which Mao feared would last
"year after year."
101 Moreover, the Korean Peninsula was a traditional strategic frontier where
China had chosen to use force to protect its interests before—namely, against Hideyoshi in the
late- 16th century and Imperial Japan in the late- 19th century.
C. TAIWAN STRAITS (1954-1955, 1958)
1. Description 102
The establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September
1954 and the Formosa Resolution of January 1955 signaled a militarization and formalization of
U.S. policies toward China vis-a-vis Taiwan. This formalization was unacceptable to Beijing.
Likewise in 1958, the U.S. placement of the 7th Fleet on alert for fear of the Chinese taking
Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Santa Monica, CA:
The RAND Corporation, 1960), 155. Whiting refutes the argument that the Chinese intervened to defend PRC
territory from the U.S. troops advancing toward the Yalu. Instead he cites the political factors of intervention and its
effects on U.S.-Japan relations, China's role in Asia, and the security of the regime from domestic threats, p. 160.
101 Chen Jian, China 's Road to the Korean War, 178.
102
" Since these two crises were so similar in nature and purpose, both are included in a single analysis.
However, for data purposes, they are treated as two incidents. In addition to Segal's work, also see Bruce Swanson,
Eighth Voyage of the Dragon (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982) for more detailed discussions of these crises.
60
advantage of American preoccupations elsewhere (namely, the U.S. intervention in Lebanon)
was also perceived as an affront.
In 1955 the Chinese response was to seize, in a minor military action, the Dachen Islands
which Taiwan deemed indefensible and abandoned. However, the U.S. made it clear that they
would not tolerate any further moves by Beijing against the Nationalists, including actions
against Quemoy and Matsu Islands. Sporadic military engagements continued well into 1955 but
eventually dissipated and then ended altogether.
Sometime in mid-July 1958, China appeared to have made "a conscious decision.. .to-
probe U.S. intentions in continuing to support Taiwan." 103 The seizure of Quemoy, one of the
Nationalist-held islands only miles from the PRC's Fujian coast, was to be the litmus test for
U.S. support. The PLA began shelling the island on 22 August 1958. The U.S. quickly showed
its determination not to yield this time, and China lacked the strength or the will to challenge the
U.S. Mao decided to back down and settle for the long-term goal of weakening U.S. power in
the region. In an amazing confession similar to what would occur nearly thirty-eight years later
in another crisis in the Straits, Mao stated after the 1958 crisis that "I simply did not calculate
that the world would become so disturbed and turbulent [over the] firing of a few shots." 104
2. Analysis
The far-reaching Chinese justification for using force in both crises was to regain the
territory of Greater China. However, their more immediate reasons were to probe U.S. intentions






in Beijing" states that Mao saw a "golden opportunity to wage battle in the Taiwan Strait.. .and
occupy the island groups of Kinmen [Quemoy] and Matsu." The PRC's initial shelling of
Quemoy was to "determine the extent of Washington's willingness to protect Taiwan." 105
Due to the nature of the conflicts, the Chinese were able to control any undesired
escalation. Neither case exhibited a gradual escalation but rather sporadic and brief campaigns as
the Chinese saw an opportunity. 106 The use of force was limited in scope and cautious but was
inherently risky. PLA operations might provoke a determined response from the U.S. Indeed,
the U.S. formalized its relationship with the ROC in 1954 and provided substance to the
arrangement by escorting convoys to the beleaguered islands in 1958. Overall, the tactical
seizure of undefended islands (1955) combined with the intermittent shelling of Quemoy (1958)
were highly flexible and controllable operations aimed at seeing how far they could push the
Nationalists without drawing the U.S. in too deeply.
Even after the December 1954 articulation of the U.S.-Republic of China (ROC-Taiwan)
mutual defense pact, the early 1955 seizure of small islands by the PRC was preceded only by a
statement to the UN by Zhou Enlai and a few leaflets dropped on the islands warning of an
attack. Other islands had been seized in previous years and nothing seemed incremental about
the PRC's political approach. However, the limited means used and the nature of small island
warfare enabled the PRC to control the military escalation and tempo of the events.
The PLA was ostensibly used for reunification but conducted its operations for political
105
"CNA Cites PRC Perspective on 1958 Taiwan Strait Battle," Taiwan Central News Agency in English,




purposes as well. The U.S.'s response to Beijing's initial probes determined subsequent PLA
actions of territorial seizure as in 1955 or backing down and conducting face-saving periodic
shelling as they did in 1958. From the perspective of protecting sovereignty and their strategic
frontier, the Chinese acted as they always do with Taiwan—for the reunification of Greater China
based on a traditional strategic frontier. 107
D. SINO-INDIAN WAR (1962)
1. Description 108
The Sino-Indian War of 1962 was a conflict that the PRC had no intention of entering, yet
once it did determine to fight, it relished the opportunity to crush a much weaker enemy and
hopefully send a message to all who would antagonize Beijing. The conflict also gave the world
prima facie evidence of Chinese "patience and self-restraint" and magnanimous behavior in
victory. 109 India's increasing territorial encroachments (see Figure 4) into the Aksai Chin and
North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) regions and Prime Minister Nehru's seeming intransigence
to Chinese attempts at deterrence began in 1957. Eventually they cost the Indians dearly. Segal
points out that following the Tibetan Revolt of 1959 and another Taiwan Straits crisis in June
10 Qing China had fought previously over Taiwan against the Japanese in 1874 and again in 1894-1895.
The 1 895 encounter with Japan ended with the Treaty of Shimonoseki which forced China to cede the island to
Japan. It was not officially returned until after WWII.
108
In addition to Segal's brief analysis in Defending China (pp. 140-157), see Whiting's The Chinese
Calculus ofDeterrence, and Gurtov and Hwang's China Under Threat. For a strictly Chinese view of the conflict
see The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1962).
109
For more details on Chinese self-proclaimed "patience and self-restraint" during the Sino-Indian
conflict see The Sino-Indian Boundary Question which contains official PRC press releases and Whiting, The
Chinese Calculus ofDeterrence, p. 105.
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Figure 4. China-India Border: Western Sector




, the Chinese began to focus more on their border disputes with India. 111 The Indians had
perceived prior lack of attention by Beijing to be a sign of Chinese weakness or acquiescence.
However, once determined, the Chinese initiated combat against Indian patrols and eventually
routed Indian forces which retreated beyond the NEFA. The victorious PLA units stood
overlooking the Assam plain, and beyond it, central India. As evidence of their magnanimity in
victory, the Chinese called a unilateral cease-fire, repatriated all Indian prisoners of war (not a
single PLA soldier had been captured) and hardware, and withdrew to their original positions
north of the McMahon Line—a boundary which they did not officially recognize. 112
2. Analysis
The Chinese had indeed "taught India a lesson." Although doubted at the time by the
West due to the Cold War environment, the Chinese use of force against the Indians was fairly
justifiable. The Chinese viewed Indian territorial encroachments as provocative and dangerous
for three reasons. First, Tibetan stability was still in doubt after the 1959 revolt. Much of the
assistance to the Tibetans had come by way of India. Second, the recently constructed Aksai
Chin road, a critical PLA avenue between the volatile provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet, was only
a few miles from Indian probes. Third, for no apparent reason other than domestic political
consumption, the Indians had upset the status quo arrangement in the region. 113
II
Note, the Taiwan Straits "crisis" in 1962 is not included in this study because it was not much of a
crisis to begin with. It was, rather, an increase of tensions on the mainland over perceived U.S. and Nationalist









There is perhaps no better example of PRC incrementalism in crisis and conflict behavior
than their actions leading up to and during their conflict with the Indians. The Chinese
continually reiterated their warnings to the Indians since the latter began intrusive patrols in
1957. Indian patrols were in the vicinity of the newly completed Aksai Chin road linking
Xinjiang and Tibet. India claimed the road crossed some of its territory. PRC warnings
consisted of increasingly bellicose statements such as: 114
1. 9 July 1962- "sanguinary clashes may occur at any time"
2. 22 July 1962- China "can by no means sit idle"
3. 13 September 1962- "he who plays with fire will eventually be consumed by fire"
4. 21 September 1962- the "flames of war may break out"
5. 14 October 1962- "massive invasion of Chinese territory seems imminent. . .be well-
prepared... to deal resolute counterblows to any invaders!"
A moderate force of 150,000 PLA troops were in the region. But only a fraction was
required or used for operations against the Indians. Their employment was generally deliberate.
PLA units initiated combat and attacked forcefully, but also halted, consolidated and withdraw
when they could have made further attacks. The escalation of the conflict was controlled through
the strict adherence to objectives despite significant military victories. PRC extension of the war
could have guaranteed PRC territorial gains. However, the Chinese use of force was aimed at
maintaining a status quo frontier in the NEFA and Aksai Chin regions, which, as part of Tibet,
was Greater China. Additionally, it was probably hoped that the remarkable success of the PLA
would also deter any regional moves by the Soviet Union with whom the PRC had recently split
114





After earlier verbal commitments to the North Vietnamese in their expanding war with
the South, Beijing began providing concrete support in late- 1964 to their "brotherly comrades."
This
support was based on three principles of deterring the U.S. from extending the ground war into
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). First, if the U.S. sent ground forces north, China
would reciprocate and send them south. Second, China would send signals to the U.S. that
should they do so, another Korean War-type scenario would result. Third, China would avoid
direct confrontation with the U.S., but would not shrink from U.S. provocation. 116 PRC
assistance took the form of engineering troops to aid in the building and repairing of DRV roads
and bridges, anti-aircraft artillery units which would defend key North Vietnamese positions no
further south than Hanoi, and massive logistical support.
2. Analysis
Chen Jian argues that Beijing's decision to support the DRV reflected a profound
domestic agenda based on Mao's attempt to reinvigorate the domestic situation during the
11
Notable sources for this period of PLA operations are few. Segal's Defending China only covers
1964-1965. Chapter 6 (pp. 170-195) of Whiting's The Chinese Calculus ofDeterrence discusses the evidence and
reasons for the PLA deployment to the DRV. A more recent and probably better informed study comes from Chen
Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," The China Quarterly, No. 142 (June 1995): 356-387.
However, Chen commends Whiting on the essential validity of his work, despite not having the documents and
source materials mat were at Chen's disposal twenty years later.
116 Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 366.
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Cultural Revolution. 117 More important, however, was the international context. China had
recently split with the Soviets in a dispute that was becoming increasingly bitter. The PRC
feared encirclement by the Soviets in the north and the U.S. to the east (in Japan) and south (in
Vietnam). Moreover, Beijing wanted to deter any growing Soviet influence in Vietnam by
showing their commitment to Ho Chi Minh's communists.
The force used to display this commitment was moderate. All told more than 320,000
PLA troops were sent to Vietnam from 1965 to 1969 with a peak of 170,000 in 1967.m PLA
troops were specifically restricted to areas well north of the DRV-RVN (Republic of Vietnam)
border. The PRC ensured the U.S. was well aware of what would occur should they move U.S.
troops north. A 1 July 1964 People's Daily editorialized on the "300th serious warning" and
other PRC statements included the "cannot sit idly by" warning to the U.S. 119 Any extension of
the ground war into the DRV would clearly result in PRC intervention. Politically, these
warnings were not really a sign of incremental crisis management, but rather an ultimatum to the
U.S.—an ultimatum reinforced by their shared Korean experience. Militarily, the covert
positioning of troops in specific areas well north of the border enabled a flexible option of
plausible deniability. At the same time PLA positioning ensured the American intelligence
community was aware of Chinese presence and the Americans recognized the consequences of
an expanded war. In this context, they were very successful in deterring escalation of the war.






Whiting, Chinese Calculus ofDeterrence, 173 from 3 July 1964 Peking Review article.
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influence in Vietnam and prevent encirclement by the imperialist (American) as well as
revisionist (Soviet) superpowers.
The PLA presence was not territorial in nature. Beijing's political motives were based on
deterrence (to the U.S. and USSR) and support (for the DRV) rather than any irredentist
claims. 120 Hence, Beijing's use of the PLA in "operations to assist Vietnam and resist America"
were based on a regional perception of sovereignty and influence. Despite Vietnamese quasi-
independence since 939 A.D. and numerous clashes before and after, China had exerted at least
tributary status over Vietnam for two millennia. 121 History has proven Vietnam to be a
traditional strategic frontier for China. On this occasion, the Chinese were there to maintain PRC
influence and deter expanding U.S. and Soviet influence.
F. SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICTS (1969)
1. Description
Like the Sino-Indian conflict, the accounts of the clashes between the Soviets and
Chinese in 1969 vary considerably (see Figure 5). 122 Not surprisingly, each side blames the other
120
It is acknowledged, as Chen Jian asserts, that Mao used the imperialist American threat "to prepare
politically and militarily for this coming challenge" in Indochina and elsewhere in Asia. However, it was the
opportunistic use of the international situation by Mao to promote domestic themes, not the creation of an external




There is a considerable amount of material on this dispute, most of which has been written from the
Soviet or Western perspective vis-a-vis the Cold War. An excellent analysis from this vantage point is Thomas W.
Robinson's chapter "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict" in Diplomacy ofPower: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political
Instrument, ed. Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), 265-313. A detailed
account taken from actual Chinese participants can be found in Neville Maxwell's "The Chinese Account of the
1969 Fighting at Chenpao," The China Quarterly, No. 56 (October 1973): 730-739. Other notable analyses include
Tai Sung An, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, (Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1973) and Richard Wich,
Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study ofPolitical Change and Communication (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1980). For a recent picture of the disputed island and its situation in the river channel, see Beijing Review,
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Figure 5. PRC-USSR Border
Source: Online at [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/middle_east_and_asia].
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for initiation of hostilities. Chinese-Soviet clashes first took place at Zhenbao (Damansky)
Island in the far Northeast region of Manchuria and spilled all the way over to Xinjiang on the far
Northwest border of the PRC. The clash at Zhenbao Island on 02 March 1969 was the
culmination of an intensifying state of belligerence between the two nations. 123 Which side
initiated combat is still debatable. It is clear, however, that the Chinese were better prepared for
such an eventuality and had a second patrol waiting in reserve. 124 As a result, it was the Chinese
who got the better of the Soviets in this first encounter. Less than two weeks later,
the roles were reversed and it was the Soviets who came better prepared, this time with armor
and more artillery.
Determining the victor depends upon which account is read. Regardless, the Chinese still
hold the island. Believing that bilateral discussion would place them at a disadvantage, the
Chinese steadfastly resisted Soviet attempts to initiate discourse over their boundary disputes. In
response, Soviet troops instigated conflicts on the Xinjiang border inflicting large losses on the
Chinese troops. Meanwhile, the Soviets hinted at preemptive "rocket" strikes on PRC nuclear
weapons facilities. Coupled with the Xinjiang show of force and Soviet threats of a surgical
nuclear strike, the Chinese were forced to the bargaining table in October of 1969.
2. Analysis
Chinese objectives were to deter any Soviet expansionism ("social imperialism"),
123
According to Tai Sung An, "thousands" of previous border incidents had taken place, 15. Both sides,
however, chose to propagandize this particular event until each nation was in a frenzy over the incident.
124
Maxwell interviewed the Zhenbao PLA Frontier Guard patrol commander who "strongly rejected" his
suggestion that the Chinese had set a trap for the Soviets, 734.
71
especially in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 125 The Soviet threat cut
across all three Chinese interpretations of sovereignty: (1) Core China (the PRC had a legitimate
claim to Zhenbao), (2) Greater China (the Soviet threat to stability in Xinjiang and its
implications to other Chinese autonomous regions), and (3) regional (the threat of Soviet
hegemony over China and throughout Asia). But it was the latter which was of paramount
consideration. Beijing's concern over the extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine 126 to Asia or any
similarly clumsy bullying in Asia by their erstwhile ally was central to their decision to make a
point and resist increasing Soviet border pressures on the Ussuri River.
The force used by the PLA throughout was limited. Both they and the Soviets were
careful not to escalate the situation. Each committed a relatively small number of troops,
artillery and tanks (Soviets) and no airpower. While the PLA was cautious in its employment
and avoided moving beyond stated territorial claims, Beijing made the continued use of force a
risky one when they refused repeated Soviet calls for negotiation. Likewise, there was a noted
absence of pre-crisis political methods of deterrence by the Chinese. Militarily, the character of
border clashes allowed incremental and escalation control responses, but did not necessarily
result in any PRC actions to control the conflict. It was the looming nuclear precipice along with
125
Wich, 7. Wich's work is the best on this Czechoslovakia linkage to the PRC decision to use force with
the Soviets.
The Brezhnev Doctrine, as USSR leader Leonid Brezhnev's defense of the invasion of Czechoslovakia
came to be known, stated that "each Communist party is free to apply the basic principles of Marxism Leninism and
of socialism in its country, but it cannot depart from these principles." When a country does depart, it is the right
and duty of the other socialist countries, and "above all the Soviet Union" as the leader of the Socialist Camp, "to
act decisively.. .against antisocialist forces." Obtained from Pravda, September 25, 1968; translated by Novosti,
Soviet press agency and obtained online at [http://www.fordham.edu/halsah7moa71968brezhnev.html]. This implied
that not only could the Soviet Union intervene in Warsaw Pact countries but in the PRC as well. The Brezhnev
Doctrine was a significant concern for CCP leadership undergoing the throes of the Cultural Revolution.
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a "lesson" in Xinjiang that eventually forced Mao to allow Zhou Enlai to negotiate with Kosygin
and reduce tensions. Even then, it was only Ho Chi Minlr s funeral in Vietnam which afforded
the Chinese a face-saving way to initiate contact.
Since the conflicts in both regions ostensibly involved disputed land, the conflict can be
described as territorial in nature. However, in a broader sense, the Chinese were sending a
strategic signal to the Soviets and merely used the border disputes as the vehicle for transmitting
their message. Finally, Beijing chose these hinterlands as part of their strategic frontier because
of the larger discord with the Soviets, but this was not a shift or an extension of what they had
been previously willing to use force to protect. Rather, it was an attempt to validate the status-
quo and deter further territorial and ideological encroachment by the Soviets.
G. PARACEL (XISHA) ISLANDS (1974)
1. Description
Fighting ensued between the PLA Navy (PLAN) and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN)
over the Paracel Island group from 15-20 January 1974. As usual, each account varied, but it is
generally assumed the Chinese instigated the clash by attacking the weak and vulnerable RVN
forces scattered over the island chain after Saigon's forces had probably attempted to drive off
PRC fishing vessels. The PLAN landed 600 men on the various islets and used aircraft based out
of Hainan for support in dislodging the Vietnamese. By the end of the month the PRC
effectively controlled the entire Paracel group. 127
1 0~7
~ The preceding section relies heavily on Marwyn S. Samuels' Contestfor the South China Sea (New
York: Methuen and Co., 1982) and John W. Garver's "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction
of Bureaucratic and National Interests," The China Quarterly, No. 132 (December 1992): 999-1028. Segal also
covers the 1974 Paracel campaign by the PRC. A more recent overview of claims and counterclaims in the region is
U.S. Pacific Command's April 1996 South China Sea Reference Book.
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2. Analysis
Beijing's moves in the South China Sea deserve special attention because they were the
first military moves by the People's Republic into the maritime region. As will be discussed
later, these moves were also harbingers of future Chinese expansionism. China's claims to the
Paracels are rooted at least in the Ming Dynasty and Cheng Ho's voyages in the 15th century and
arguably as far back as two thousand years. 128 However, rarely have the Chinese had the need or
wherewithal to backup these claims.
When the tottering RVN regime began selling drilling rights near the Spratlys and
incorporated the islets into the RVN provincial framework, Beijing decided to react at the only
place it could—the Paracels (which both Vietnams also claimed). But the PRC reaction was
more than just an attempt to secure oil and natural gas reserves in the South China Sea. It was a
continuation of China's reclamation of great power status manifested in the irredentist claim that
the four island groups in the South China Sea are sovereign Chinese territory. 129 The difference
between this first move in the South China Sea, and previous attempts at consolidating areas of
the extinct empire such as Tibet, was that China's claim to the South China Sea was even more
contentious than its claim in the Asian highlands. The assertion of China's irredentist claims was
nothing new; however, the method and location which they chose were.
PLA actions in such areas as the Paracel and Spratly Islands were wholly dependent upon
the Chinese perception of the risks of such moves. The 1974 seizure of the Paracel group from
Swanson, 268.
129
Samuels, 7. The four island groups in the South China Sea claimed by China are the Pratas Island and
Reefs (Dongsha), Paracel Islands (Xisha), Macclesfield Bank (Chungsha), and the SpraUy Islands (Nansha).
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the crumbling South Vietnamese regime was indicative of China's willingness and skill in
probing world reactions to the assertion of the PRC's historical territorial claims. When faced
with little to no resistance by the great powers, they pursued their objectives fully. The Paracel
operation was a classic case of opportunism. The world had little desire to challenge Chinese
claims. 130 It was a limited use of force, but nevertheless a meaningful shift in policy, as the
PLAN was first used to assert Chinese claims of sovereignty. In retrospect, some have
interpreted an 1 1 January 1974 denunciation of Saigon's awarding of drilling rights for the
contested region as "a signal for [Chinese] action in the Paracels," but there was no coherent
build-up toward deterrence. 131
Even against a weak opponent it was an unprecedented shift in strategy for the PRC. The
PRC claimed "complete, indisputable sovereignty" 132 over the Paracels. Their actions in January
1974 were intended to extend PRC definitive control to the Paracel region and exhibited a
significant expansion of their strategic frontier. Heretofore, Beijing had chosen only to use
diplomatic and symbolic means to assert its sovereignty in the South China Sea. Likewise, from
a regional perspective, China knew that if it did not move on the Paracels in 1974 it would only
be a matter of time before Hanoi consolidated its position and asserted its claims over Saigon's
former possessions. Beijing saw a golden opportunity and took it.
130
The RVN was near dissolution; the Vietnamese communists were busy finishing off the South and had
no desire to seriously challenge the PRC's move in the Paracel's and risk yet another war; the Soviets did not want
to risk pushing die Chinese further toward the Americans; and the U.S. had no stomach for another Southeast Asian
intervention over a few specks of land to help a dying ally.
131






On 17 February 1979 the PLA sent at least six infantry divisions across the Sino-
Vietnamese border (see Figure 6) in a move to "teach the Vietnamese a lesson." 134 Ostensibly a
response to Vietnamese intrusions on its frontier, the Chinese maintained that their "sovereignty
and territorial integrity" along the border were violated more than seven hundred times by the
Vietnamese in the preceding six months alone. 135 In addition to supposed border violations,
other irritations in PRC-Vietnamese relations included confiscation of ethnic Chinese property
and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. Finally, Beijing
also cited Vietnam's Christmas Day invasion in 1978 of Kampuchea (Cambodia) aimed at
Chinese ally Pol Pot as an attempt to establish an Indochina Federation "in their quest for
regional hegemonism." 136
Having attained the goals that were set for them prior to entering Vietnam, China ordered
the PLA to withdraw only sixteen days after they entered Vietnamese territory. The PLA's
133
There is a dearth of Western analysis of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Most of the existing material
came within a year of the end of the conflict and subsequently may not be judged fully in its historical context and
without the benefit of any additional sources that have since become available. In additional to Segal's account in
Defending China (pp. 211-230), see Edgar O'Ballance, The Wars in Vietnam 1954-1980 (New York: Hippocrene
Books, Inc., 1981), 213-227 and Daniel Tretiak, "China's Vietnam War and its Consequences," The China
Quarterly, No. 80 (December 1979): 740-767. Another account is from former South Vietnamese official Nguyen
Mann Hung "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play Among Communist Neighbors," Asian Survey, Vol. XIX,
No. 10, (October 1979): 1037-1052.
134
Tretiak states that Deng Xiaoping, as a means of feeling out the U.S. response only weeks before the
invasion, first used this phrase in a television interview while visiting the United States.
IOC
Official press release by Xinhua News Agency quoted in Beijing Review, 23 February 1979, 8-9.
"Indochina Federation" and "regional hegemonism" were two consistently used phrases throughout
PRC official pronouncements during and following the two week war.
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Figure 6. PRC-Vietnam Border
Source: Online at [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/middle_east_and_asia].
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twenty-five mile penetration into Vietnam was excruciatingly slow and reportedly cost them
more than 20,000 casualties, half of which were killed. The Vietnamese casualties were
estimated to be 50,000. 137 By 15 March all PLA troops were back in Chinese territory and a
tense but stable status quo returned.
2. Analysis
While the Chinese outwardly claimed victory in the conflict since they had achieved their
military goals, they recognized the fact that they had failed in their political goals of easing
border tensions, relieving pressure on ethnic Chinese in Vietham (they continued to be harassed
and deported) and compelling Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea. 138 However, when
evaluating PRC behavior in this conflict one must look closer at exactly why Beijing chose to use
force.
The Chinese claim that they were defending their territory against Vietnamese aggression
was dubious. Vietnamese intentions and ability to threaten China's southeastern border also are
debatable. It was likely that Chinese enmity was indirectly, if not equally, aimed at an intruding
Soviet Union. The Chinese sought to display their displeasure with the Vietnamese for allowing
the Soviets such a strong position on the Chinese southern flank. At the same time, Beijing
attempted to assuage Soviet fears over the invasion. While as many as 200,000 soldiers moved
across the border making it a moderate use of force, the PLA was careful not to escalate the
137
Tretiak, 757. Note, these figures are still debatable. O'Ballance listed total casualties for both sides at
45,000. Regardless, it is clear that the fighting was fierce and bloody.
138
Tretiak, 753 and Nguyen, 1050.
78

conflict by involving only a small number of tanks and mechanized vehicles and no aircraft. 139
However, there was no real political incremental deterrence other than bringing attention to
alleged Vietnamese border violations and strategic political jockeying between Beijing and
Vietnam vis-a-vis the two superpowers. Military incrementalism such as the lulls in battle to
allow an enemy response was even less evident primarily due to the poor performance of the
PLA. The PLA was unable to dictate the tempo of conflict. Instead they were challenged by the
Vietnamese just to meet their operational objectives. While PRC pronouncements repeatedly
stated that they wanted not "a single inch of Vietnamese territory" and would "strictly keep to
defending the border" after "counterattacking the Vietnamese aggressors as they deserve," 140 the
Soviets issued warnings to the Chinese not to escalate the conflict any further. 141 To an extent,
Beijing was able to control escalation control by not using significant numbers of armor or
aircraft. But de-escalation could only be effected by the withdrawal of troops. Even that could
not be done without losing face until stated objectives had been met.
Only weeks prior, Deng had returned from the U.S. and Japan confident that those powers
would endorse the invasion or at least remain silent. These efforts by the Chinese to demonstrate
the punitive rather than permanent nature of the attack were attempts to temper the superpowers'
responses. However, the PRC had little assurance that the Soviet Union would not intervene
PLA force allocation figures obtained from O'Ballance, 224-225. Note, however, that while I maintain
that the PLA purposely used limited armor and no aircraft in order to emphasize China's punitive but restrained
attack, O'Ballance states that the lack of armor and aircraft numbers were due to availability and capability
restrictions respectively (p. 225). Tretiak (p. 750) and Nguyen (p. 1049) implicitly support the view proposed in
this thesis.
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either directly in Vietnam or indirectly somewhere along the disputed Sino-Soviet frontier.
Moreover, Deng significantly misperceived the U.S. position due in large part to mixed or
nonexistent signals given by the Carter administration. Thus, the Chinese decision to invade was
an extremely risky use of the PLA. To make matters worse, PLA capability was overestimated
after its brilliant success against the weak Indian Army in 1962, while Vietnamese capabilities
were underestimated.
Despite the poor showing by the PLA, the war had strategically positive implications for
the Chinese. The 1979 war in Vietnam served notice that Beijing would resist further
Vietnamese expansionism (Thailand was considered the next domino) and regional hegemony, as
well as any other perceived Soviet attempts at encirclement via proxy. Moreover, the threat of a
second PRC invasion led Vietnam to divert scarce resources to maintain a strong border force on
its northern frontier—resources that otherwise would have gone toward rebuilding the country
and making it the regional force which China was attempting to prevent.
The PLA's punitive attack on Vietnam had several complicated objectives. While
Beijing explicitly stated the war was for defense of its territorial integrity, the conflict was not
territorial in nature. Perhaps most important was what Beijing called "the greater and lesser
hegemonists, working hand in glove." 142 In short, Soviet greater and Vietnamese regional
hegemonism were the real reasons for the PLA excursion. The Chinese admitted as much in a
Renmin Ribao editorial titled "The Crux of the Sino-Vietnamese Dispute" in which the author
cited "hostility towards China...implemented by the Vietnamese authorities with the backing of
142 23 February 1979 speech to the Security Council by Chen Chu, the PRC's representative to the UN.
Excerpts cited in Beijing Review, 02 March 1979, 21.
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Soviet social-imperialism. Herein lies the crux of the matter." 143 As perceived by the Chinese,
this hostility was manifested in Vietnamese neglect and disregard of traditional Chinese
influence in the region. The Chinese zero-sum perception of international relations suggested
any gain in Soviet or Vietnamese power and influence in the region meant a commensurate loss
by the PRC. Thus, an attempt at Vietnamese hegemony or influence in Southeast Asia was a
threat to PRC regional sovereignty and influence. 144 Finally, considering this perceived threat,
one should not be too surprised at the Chinese use of force against Vietnam. As described above
in the Vietnam (1965-1969) analysis, China's southern strategic frontier has traditionally
included Vietnam since the earliest days of the empire.
I. THE SPRATLYS [JOHNSON REEF (1988)/MISCHIEF REEF (1995)]
1. Description 145
For analytical purposes, the discussion of the two PRC uses of force in the Spratlys are
combined. Figure 7 is a map of the area.
Routine surveying of the Spratlys by the PRC began in November 1980 with PLA Air
Force (PLA-AF) overflights. Later, survey vessels ventured as far south as James Shoal, less
143
See Renmin Ribao editorial titled "The Crux of the Sino-Vietnamese Dispute" quoted in Beijing
Review, 23 March 1979, 19-21.
144
Tretiak (pp. 740, 753) and Nguyen (pp. 1050-1051) tend to support this conclusion.
14
While not the most recent, Garver's "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of
Bureaucratic and National Interests," The China Quarterly, No. 132 (December 1992): 999-1028, remains the best
work for this analysis. Other more comprehensive studies include Marwyn S. Samuels, Contestfor the South China
Sea (New York: Methuen, 1982) and Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea
(Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997). Some recent articles include Allan Shephard, "Maritime
Tensions in the South China Sea and the Neighborhood: Some Solutions," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.
17, No. 2 (April-June 1994): 181-21 1 and William J. Dobson and M. Taylor Fravel "Red Herring Hegemon: China
in the South China Sea." Current History (September 1997): 258-263. Numerous other useful articles have been
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Figure 7. Spratly Islands
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than a hundred miles off the Malaysian coast of Borneo. James Shoal, despite being a coral reef
over fifty feet below the surface, was claimed as "the southernmost outpost of China's
territory."
140 By 1988 the PRC had begun a major effort to establish a permanent physical
presence in the Spratlys. Fiery Cross Reef was the initial location selected and in August a
permanent "oceanographic research station" was established. 147
At this time the PRC's main competitor for the Spratlys was Vietnam, which, like China,
claims the enure Spratly group. However, due to material support from Beijing in Vietnam's
wars, the Vietnamese communists did not articulate their claim until 1975, after the Chinese '
seizure of the Paracels. By the late 1980s tensions over the Spratly claims were rising. The 14
March 1988 Johnson Reef incident was merely a culmination of tensions between the
Vietnamese and Chinese as they raced to build up their permanent structures (and hence their
claim to sovereignty) in the numerous shoals, reefs, and islets that make up the Spratlys. The
Chinese account of the skirmish stated that the Vietnamese landed forty-three troops on Johnson
Reef against the verbal demands of Chinese personnel already on the islands. Small arms fire
broke out and covering PLAN surface vessels opened fire on the Vietnamese ships. Seventy-two
Vietnamese were killed and two Vietnamese ships were sunk. 148 The Chinese maintained
possession of the reef. Immediately after the clash, the Chinese occupied six more islands. 149 By
This description is provided by Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea," 1008, from an




Garver. "China's Push Through the South China Sea," 1013. Note, the accounts vary on the exact
number of Vietnamese casualties. The South China Sea Reference Book states that three Vietnamese ships were
sunk, 9.
149
Dobson and Fravel, 259.
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1997 China had occupied eight sites and Vietnam twenty-one.
Others in the region also sought to reinforce claims. The Philippines, Malaysia, and
Taiwan had occupied eight, four, and one islands respectively. 150 Another incident erupted in
1995 when China built military structures on Mischief Reef, less than 120 nautical miles from
the Philippines' Palawan Island. 151 In retaliation, the Philippines seized Chinese fishing boats
and destroyed Chinese markers on the site. Despite unrelenting tension (mainly between Beijing
and Manila) over incidents involving "sovereignty plates," fishing rights, and further
construction on existing facilities, the Spratlys have remained relatively peaceful since 1988. 152
2. Analysis
The Chinese have deliberately maintained an ambiguous claim over the South China Sea,
especially in the Spratlys. In what Manila calls "talk and take," 153 Beijing has floated shrewd
proposals to other claimants trying to prove their sincerity for peaceful resolution of the disputes.
However, there is no easy answer to the historical, legalistic and symbolic claims that each nation
has put forth. China, perhaps no less than Vietnam, has taken advantage of this ambiguity.




Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian (no relation to previously cited author of same name)
claimed that the facilities were constructed under the authority of "local fishing administrative departments.. .to
provide shelter for [Chinese fishermenl." Beijing Review, 20-26 February 1995, 25. However most foreign reports
stated the facilities were military in nature and included a wharf capable of handling frigate-sized warships. Later,
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen played down the incident stating "I don't think there is any tension or crisis
in the South China Sea." Beijing Review, 20-26 March 1995, 21.
" Sovereignty plates are nothing more than markers placed on the reefs indicating a country's control.
153
See "Manila looks for peaceful solution to Spratlys Tow,"South China Morning Post-Internet Edition
online at [http://www.scmp.com] (hereafter referred to as SCMP-IE), 7 November 1998.
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has proposed peaceful joint development of the islands and the mutual withdrawal of all military
forces in the region. Garver cites this proposal as important, signifying a fundamental shift in
PRC Spratlys policy from one of geostrategic to economic importance. 154 A policy that had been
primarily, though not exclusively, designed to prevent superpowers, or their proxies', penetration
and encirclement of China's strategic frontier became a policy designed to exploit the economic
resources of the region—even if that meant cooperation with other claimants.
Whether one subscribes to this fundamental change or not, initial PRC designs on the
Spratlys were clearly designed to expand the frontier and extend the Soviet and American naval
threat hundreds of miles to the south. 155 China's use of force in the Spratlys, indeed the whole
South China Sea, has been slow and incremental using only limited moves that were deliberately
planned and advantageously executed. 156 Whether an attempt to capture "lost territories" or gain
access to potentially tremendous economic resources, their moves have been territorial. 157 PRC
claims of "undisputed territorial sovereignty" in the region are little more than regional assertions
of influence. The Spratlys represent an expansion of China's strategic frontier. However, if it is
154
Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea,'' 1000.
155
Garver says essentially the same thing in regard to the Chinese policy toward the Paracels, "China's
Push Through the South China Sea," 1001.
Individually, PRC moves in the South China Sea appear episodic and to have little pause and effect
characteristics. However, as Garver' s "China's Push Through the South China Sea" article asserts, it has been a
steady incremental expansion over the course of two decades.
Dobson and Fravel state that rather than "hegemonic objectives. ...China's behavior is best viewed in
terms of its fragmented foreign policy decision-making process, the imperatives of domestic politics, and the
leadership's crisis of legitimacy," 260. This author disagrees. The leadership gained little domestically from
seizing shoals and knocking heads with a weak Vietnam or an even more impotent Philippines. Similarly, the
gradual and incremental advances in the South China Sea over decades belie any strategy that was based purely on
domestic concerns or a "fragmented foreign policy." Rather, it was a function of adaptive interests of the PLAN in
an effort to strengthen bureaucratic prestige coincident and collaborating with PRC leadership seeking to enhance
regional power and national economic interests.
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true that economic considerations now drive its policy in the South China Sea, it remains to be
seen whether or not the PRC will choose force to assert their claims against others in the region
at the risk of damaging any possibilities of harvesting this economic potential.
J. TAIWAN STRAITS (1995-1996)
1. Description 158
The crisis essentially began in May 1995 when the Clinton administration was forced by a
sympathetic Congress to allow Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui a visa to attend his college
reunion. Previously, the administration had repeatedly assured the PRC—which clearly
understood Lee's "vacation diplomacy" tactics—that no visa would be forthcoming. In response
the PRC conducted the first of six military exercises. In June 1995 the PLA held live-fire missile
"tests" only ninety miles from Taiwan's northern shores. A second round of missile tests was
held from 15-25 August 1995 north of Taiwan. In November, just before Taiwan's legislative
elections, the PLA held large ground exercises including a simulated invasion. 159 These events
were designed to demonstrate that the PLA had the capacity to interdict and disrupt Taiwan's sea
and air traffic. 160 Even after the longer more complex tests of August, the U.S. failed to respond.
Not until December did the passing USS Nimitz (CVN 68) carrier battle group (CVBG) send a
message to Beijing by transiting through the Taiwan Straits on its way to the Persian Gulf.
1 CO
Both sides of the Pacific were flooded with articles and descriptions of the crisis. An early and fairly
complete analysis was done by John Garver, Face Off (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). Another is
Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, eds. James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press in cooperation with The American Enterprise Institute, 1997).
"XINHUA Reports China Missile Exercises Announcement," Hong Kong AFP, 05 March 1996,
FBIS-CHI-96-044.
160
Garver, Face Off, 74.
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However, even then, the White House did not announce the Nimitz transit until six weeks after it
occurred. 161
The PRC held the 1996 "exercises" (note the shift from "tests" in 1995 to "exercises" in
1996) in three phases involving 150,000 troops, 300 aircraft, and elements of all three PLAN
fleets.
162 Phase I (08-15 March) involved live-fire missile exercises within 15 and 55 miles from
Taiwan's major ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung respectively. Unsure of where the PLA
exercises would lead, on 09 March the U.S. ordered the USS Independence (CV 62) CVBG to the
region. Two days later the Nimitz CVBG was rushed to the Straits as well. The same day as the
Independence received its orders, the PRC announced Phase n (12-20 March) of the exercise
including PLA air, land, and naval units conducting simulated operations just west of the
Taiwan-held Pescadores. The third phase (18-25 March) was a large scale joint exercise against
Haitan, a PRC held island located off the mainland coast having similar features as Taiwan. U.S.
intelligence concluded that inclement weather caused the cancellation of most of the third phase
which was to involve over 30,000 troops. 163
2. Analysis
While the 1950s Taiwan Straits crises reflected Chinese probes of U.S. intentions, the
Ibid., 96. To be sure, the Chinese were aware of the transit as the U.S. no doubt wanted them to be.
But the timing of the announcement left ambiguity in exacUy what and how purposeful a message the U.S. was
trying to send. There has even been some speculation that the U.S. Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific
(CINCPAC), Admiral Joseph Prueher. ordered the transit on his own initiative without the explicit approval of
those back in Washington (ibid). However, it seems highly unlikely that any move as significant as this would be




Preceding paragraph derived from multiple sources including Garver, Face Off, 96-106 and FBIS-CHI
articles "XINHUA Reports China Missile Exercise Announcement," FBIS-CHI-96-044 and '"Military Observer' on
3d Round Combined Exercise," Hong Kong Wen Wei Po, 16 March 1996 translated in FBIS-CHI-96-053.
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1990s incident lacked any such motive. The Chinese had no objective to determine U.S.
response, but merely wanted to reinforce their indignation over increased Taiwanese moves
toward independence and reaffirm their commitment to use force against Taiwan if the latter's
"splittist" activities went too far. Indeed, the Chinese were shocked that the U.S. reacted so
strongly to their missile exercises. The Chinese felt that they had made it perfectly clear that
while they retained the right to use force to deter Taiwanese independence moves, for the present
they had no intention of attacking Taiwan. 164 Nevertheless, to many observers exact PRC
motives were not so clear. 165 Moreover, an equivocating U.S. response perhaps led the Chinese
to believe they could continue their method of coercion against Taiwan without any
repercussions. While Beijing lost a certain amount of face due to the eventual strong U.S.
response, the PRC also sent a message to both Taiwan and the U.S. of their continued
willingness to go to war over their "renegade province." Not coincidentally, since the crisis the
two major Taiwanese political parties have toned down their independence rhetoric. 166
Exactly what was Beijing's intent? Ostensibly, they designed the exercises to
demonstrate the PLA's "determination and capabilities for safeguarding national unity,
164
See Garver, Face Off, 111-1 17.
165
China's opUons at intimidation, coercion and outright bellicosity were numerous. Attacks on Quemoy
and Matsu or missile attacks on Taiwanese cities had to be considered by ROC defense forces as well as the
American forces standing off in the East China Sea. For a picture of the uncertainty surrounding PRC intentions
see "Playing With Fire," Far East Economic Review (FEER), 14 March 1996, p. 14-15, 21 and "The Pacific
Moment," FEER, 21 March 1996, p. 5, 14-16.
1 The runner up in the 1996 election, Peng Ming-min from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
generally acknowledged as a pro-independence party , recently quit the party arguing that it had become soft on
independence. See "Forthright election runner-up quits DPP," SCMP-IE. 03 September 1998.
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sovereignty, and territorial integrity." 167 They made little attempt to conceal the fact that they
were intended to influence Taiwanese public opinion and possibly even the election. More
important, however, was the threat against "the schemes of foreign forces [expecting] to interfere
with China's reunification and to bring about the 'independence of Taiwan."" 68 However,
despite U.S. accusations of Beijing's "reckless" behavior, the PLA's actions were notably
cautious and incremental throughout the exercises, especially those in 1996 during which a U.S.
response had to be considered. Despite involving more than 150,000 personnel, the actual
combat elements involved in the exercise were limited in nature. The PLA ground forces did not
mass men and material that would be sufficient to invade Taiwan. The PLAN did not have all of
its lift capability in the area. Nor did the PLA-AF flood the Straits with its fighters and attack
aircraft. The possibility remained that this exercise was a prelude to a move against the ROC
held islands adjacent to the mainland. As one source has suggested, however, since the 1950s
when the islands of Quemoy and Matsu nearly engulfed the Straits in a full-blown war, the
islands have become strategically useless. 169 It is likely, however, the PRC had no intent of doing
anything more than sending a message.
The timed announcements of the 1996 exercises confirm this viewpoint. The first
exercise was announced 05 March. The same day the U.S. announced the Independence
deployment, 09 March, Xinhua announced the second phase of the exercise. Evidently, the
1 f\l
"Joint Editorial Comments on Military Exercises," Xinhua Domestic Service, 15 March 1996,
translated in FBIS-CHI-96-053.
16
"Li Peng Rejects Taiwan Split From Mainland," Xinhua in English, 05 March 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-
044.
169
"General loses frontline fervour," SCMP-IE, 31 August 1998.
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Chinese were determined to carry through with their plans. On the 1 1 March the U.S. announced
the Nimitz deployment to the region. Still not deterred, Xinhua announced four days later the
third and last phase of the exercise. The Chinese incrementally announced their exercises and
had every opportunity to cancel them without losing face. In other words, it was not known that
China was going to conduct three exercises. Thus, the Chinese were deliberate in their
announcements of the exercises and cautious in their implementation. The exercises did entail a
significant amount of risk, which Beijing felt was worth it considering the message being sent.
Though there was no intent to invade, the PLA coercive use of force in 1995-1996 was
territorial in nature. It was an effort to prevent any de jure territorial "loss" that a Taiwanese
declaration of independence would have entailed. That is one reason why Beijing views a
declaration of independence by Taipei with so much hostility. The PRC Defense Minister was
quoted as saying, "As long as Taiwan is not liberated, the Chinese people's historical humiliation
is not washed away; as long as the Motherland is not reunited, our people's armed forces
responsibility is not fulfilled." 170 As has been the case for years, the PRC's sovereignty over
Taiwan was considered part of Greater China that, along with Macao, is the only remaining
scourge from their century of humiliation. Similarly, just as it was in the 1890s against Japan
and the 1950s against the U.S., Taiwan represented a traditional strategic frontier where the PRC
would use force to prevent undue foreign influence or encouragement for unification.
K. SUMMARY
From a detailed view, there seems to be little pattern to the use of force by Communist
China. However, when viewed from the PRC's fundamental interests, the preservation or the
170
Ibid., 102. Quote of General Chi Haotian.
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extension of historically claimed sovereignty has been their most likely casus belli. Cold War
confrontation and the prevention of regional hegemony have been derivatives, but not exceptions
to this rule. Likewise, recent trends have proven that the Chinese strategic frontier is expanding
to include areas previously incapable of being affected by PLA power projection or not
considered worth fighting for. As the next chapter will show, aggregate case study data provides
empirical evidence confirming these points.
91
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V. ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS
A. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDY DATA
The data provided by the case study analyses lead to several interesting conclusions which
are listed below. Table 6 provides cross-references to the parameters discussed in the case
studies. The purpose of the table is not quantitative, but rather to elucidate the interrelationship
between the parameters and their mutual frequency of occurrence. For example, limited force
was used a total of eight times by the PRC. Vis-a-vis conflicts of territorial origin, limited force
was used in eight of nine instances. Vis-a-vis the PRC's perceived strategic frontier, limited force
was used in the maintenance of the status-quo once, in the '"defense" of a traditional strategic
frontier four times, and in expansion three times.
1. Force Used 171
In eight of twelve conflicts (67 percent), the PRC used 50,000 troops or less. This is
somewhat surprising for a country that had espoused the people's war doctrine, vowed to lure the
enemy in deep, and had the largest standing military throughout the Cold War. In all eight
instances except one, territory was the driving factor behind the decision to use force. 172 A
moderate use of force was used in three conflicts. These three included the traditional strategic
frontier of Vietnam (twice) and the reprisal against Indian attempts to upset the status quo in the
171 As a reminder, limited force was used in eight conflicts (Tibet, all three Taiwan Straits crises, USSR,
Paracel Islands, Johnson Reef, and Mischief Reef), moderate force three times (India, both Vietnam conflicts), and
substantial force in only one occasion (Korea).
The lone exception is the border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969. As previously mentioned, I
have categorized the conflict as territorial because it was ostensibly over disputed land. But it had a more strategic
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NEFA and Aksai Chin regions. Surprisingly, only in the Korean War intervention did the PRC
commit a substantial force. This substantial troop commitment occurred when the Chinese
perceived their regional interests at stake within their traditional strategic frontier. Similarly, two
of the three instances in which the PRC used moderate force involved a threat to their regional
influence, again within their traditional strategic frontier. The data indicates a PRC willingness to
use increased force beyond its gates into areas that have traditionally been within its orbit.
However, when expanding their frontier, the Chinese have restricted their use of force. 173
2. Incrementalism 174
The case study data supports the conclusion that the PRC approaches crises and conflicts
incrementally. Beijing uses timing and pauses in intensity of diplomacy and conflict to allow the
opponent time to react and provide escalatory relief options for both itself and its adversary. Ten
of the twelve (83 percent) cases saw politically or militarily incremental PRC actions. Even when
discarding PRC South China Sea actions, which were not necessarily incremental in themselves
but were considered as three incremental steps advancing Chinese interests in the area, six of nine
crises/conflicts were incremental. Specifically, the Chinese use of key phrases such as "cannot sit
idly by" should be regarded with extreme caution. Likewise, pauses in intensity of battle should
1 3
For a qualification to this determination, refer below to the strategic frontier data conclusions. PRC
expansion in their maritime frontier via limited use of force is perhaps just as much a function of littoral and
maritime warfare than any PRC tendency to use limited force.
1 4
The nine cases which were viewed as incremental include Tibet, Korea, all three Taiwan Straits
crises, India. USSR, and the Paracel and Spratly Islands operations. As noted, the South China Sea operauons are
viewed as incremental in their entirety (i.e., each was a stepping stone) and not necessarily individually. Though
there was a degree of escalation control in each, PRC operations in both Vietnam conflicts were not viewed as
incremental. In seven (Korea, all three Taiwan Straits crises, both Vietnam conflicts, and the USSR) cases the
PRC was viewed as risk acceptanL In PRC operations against Tibet, India, and in the South China Sea, mere was
not determined to be a significant amount of risk.
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be viewed from not only a military perspective but also from a political perspective. The pauses
also serve as a stimulus for an opponent's response. In seven conflicts (58percent) the PRC was
judged to be considerably risk acceptant even with the chance of an expansion of the conflict.
3. Territorial 175
It should not be surprising that territorial questions as they relate to sovereignty are
paramount Chinese considerations for their security. The CoW project and others demonstrate
that "contests over territory (including boundaries) generated more wars than any other issue," 176
especially when the state is relatively new. The data presented here does not disconfirm this
hypothesis—nine of twelve (75 percent) of the disputes originated over territory. However,
contrary to Vasquez's theories 177 , the PRC has yet to show a noticeable decrease in territorial
disputes as the state matures, delimitation becomes more formalized, and its national territory is
better defined. In fact, the PRC has found new areas to press irredentist claims such as the South
China Sea.
4. Sovereignty 178
Despite claims of "never occupying an inch of foreign soil," "never being engaged in
17
~ The nine cases in which the origins of the conflict were deemed to be territorial in nature include
Tibet, all three Taiwan Straits, India, USSR, Paracel Islands, Johnson Reef, and Mischief Reef. The remaining




See Vasquez's chapter "Territorial Contiguity as a Source of Conflict Leading to War," 123-152.
1 7ft
No conflicts were over Core China. Five cases involved perceived violation or the establishment of
the PRC's sovereignty within Greater China including Tibet, all three Taiwan Straits crises, and India. Seven
cases involved the violation or the assertion of Chinese influence in the region including Korea, both Vietnam
conflicts. USSR, and the three South China Sea clashes.
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military expansion" and "by no means constituting a threat to any country," 179 the People's
Republic has yet to fight a war within Core China. Rather, all twelve cases involved either an
assertion of Chinese sovereignty outside its existing de facto borders or an attempt to deter undue
foreign presence in perceived areas of Chinese influence. Five were perceived violations of
Chinese sovereignty within Greater China while seven were regional in nature. This implies a
PRC that seeks to "protect" its sovereignty beyond its internationally recognized borders and even
extend its influence throughout the region.
5. Strategic Frontier 180
China's traditional strategic frontier was the location of seven (58 percent) disputes. Two
(India and the USSR) disputes were based on the PRC's desire to maintain a status quo in the
region while three were based on an expanded strategic frontier. More important, over the last
twenty-five years the focus on an expanded strategic frontier narrows to three of five conflicts.
These three were the PLA advances into the South China Sea. In each of these three cases the
PRC used limited force. However, the limited force used may be more a factor of maritime and
small island operations that characterized the South China Sea advances than any specific
tendency of the PRC. This expansion is more indicative of an opportunistic and carefully timed
extension of Chinese power beyond traditionally defended areas.
1 9
Primary PRC sources are littered with these statements, but for a few key references see Zhao Yining,
"How to Build Crack Troops: China Reduces the Number of Its Armed Forced by Half Million," Beijing Liaowang,
17 November 1997, translated in FBIS-CHI document FTS 1997 1229000 185. Also see Jiang Zemin's 10 March
1998 speech at the PLA delegation attending the 9th National Peoples' Congress (NPC) translated in FBIS-CHI-98-
070.
180 Of the twelve cases, two (India and the USSR) involved the maintenance of a status quo frontier. The
PRC had no designs on foreign territory, or at least did not pursue them, in these conflicts. Within its traditional
strategic frontier, the PRC engaged in seven conflicts (Tibet, Korea, the two Vietnam cases, and the three Taiwan
crises). The three cases involving expanding strategic frontiers were the PRC moves into the South China Sea.
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B. ANALYSIS OF MODERNIZATION TRENDS
It is asserted here that an understanding of past PRC conflicts, changing doctrine, and
strategic principles can aid in determining when and where the PRC is willing to use force to
attain foreign policy objectives. Analyzing PLA modernization can assist in determining how they
will use force. Moreover, PLA modernization efforts provide an indication of power projection
capabilities and the practical extent to which force can legitimate PRC territorial claims. Indeed,
just as the U.S. military's emphasis on technology and power projection sheds light on where and
what type of conflict the U.S. expects to engage in the 21 st century, so too does the PLA's
modernization emphasis elucidate their ideas of 21 st century warfare. Capability, regardless of
intention, determines the maximum utility of military force. For the PRC, PLA modernization
determines how far the Chinese can effectively extend their strategic territorial interests should
their leaders so desire.
Ever since China embraced Zhou Enlai's "Four Modernizations" in 1975, military
modernization has been one China's national goals. 181 However, not until 1989 and the
rapprochement with the Soviet Union did the PRC elevate military modernization to a level
approaching that of industrial growth and agricultural development and at least as high as science
and technology. Jiang Zemin summarized the relationship between the PRC economy and
national defense: 182
Building a modernized army and national defense is a guarantee for the country's safety and
modernization drive. But without a highly developed economy, it is also impossible to promote the
1 l The Four Modernizations included agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military.
182
Speech from Jiang Zemin to PLA deputies and National People's Congress 10 March 1998. "Jiang
asks forces to support reforms," SCMP-IE, 1 1 March 1998.
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modernization of national defense and the Army.
The warming of Moscow-Beijing ties in the late 1980s, which made sophisticated hardware again
available, coincident with sustained double-digit growth rates, provided the impetus for the
Chinese to make PLA modernization a higher priority.
Several factors, based on a triad of strategic interests, are driving China's military
modernization. First, and foremost, is reunification. The PRC will likely maintain its position of
not renouncing the use of force to settle the Taiwan question and is determined to ensure its
threats of using the PLA can be backed up with credible power projection. The second strategic
interest is the PRC's need to protect perceived vital security interests and defend its territory in
the maritime areas to the east and south. Third is Beijing's desire to consolidate and extend its
influence throughout Northeast and Southeast Asia and eventually beyond. 183 Military power
commensurate with China's perception of its place in the world and these strategic interests call
for an educated, technologically sophisticated, and qualitatively superior force far greater than
what the PLA consists of today. The success of Western high-tech weapons in the Gulf War
against Iraqi equipment very similar to their own confirmed what would happen should the
Chinese decide not to embrace technology. Finally, the need to deploy forces quickly within
China to maintain domestic stability provides another reason for effective modernization.
1. PLA-Ground Forces
Of the four PLA services, the ground forces have the lowest modernization priority. 184 In
18
^
"Introduction," Strategic Trends in China, eds. Hans Binnendijk and Ronald N. Montaperto,
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1998), 10-11.
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security Division, "Impact of China's Military
Modernization in the Pacific Region," (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1995), 23. Hereafter
cited as GAO (1995).
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September 1997 it was decided to reduce the PLA by 500,000 men over the next three years.
The ground forces will bear the brunt of this reduction. Instead of quantity, the PLA is
concentrating on training small but elite "fist" and rapid response units that can be called on to put
out potential fires throughout China and its periphery. The brigade-sized PLA Marine Corps is
also receiving attention. Notably, the PLA is not reducing its capability. The forces being cut are
likely the mass of under-trained and under-equipped men that arguably make up over half the total
force.
185 The emphasis on small elite units and an amphibious capability shows the type of threats
Beijing expects to face in the near future such as local limited conflicts on the
periphery—especially the maritime periphery.
2. PLA-AF
China's initial purchase of forty-eight Russian-made Su-27 Flankers in 1992 (now forty-
six due to accidents), with a follow-on purchase of twenty-four in 1995, for the first time
provided the PRC with front line fighters. In 1995 the PRC agreed to an assembly and purchase
agreement with the Russians for an additional two hundred aircraft to be built in China. 186
Ultimately, they hope to indigenously produce the Flanker. However, due to historically
incompetent industry attempts to reverse engineer or even reproduce foreign blueprinted military
hardware, this effort is in doubt. The remainder of the Air Force, while massive, is essentially of
1950s and 1960s Soviet design. The most glaring weakness in the Air Force power projection
capabilities is its lack of an in-flight refueling platform and an airborne warning and control system
185
"The People's Republic of China," National Security Planning Associates, Asia-Pacific: Issues and
Developments (Cambridge. MA: November 1997), 39.
186
Ibid, 40. Also see "Russian imports step in to fill the aims gap," Jane 's Defence Weekly (hereafter
cited as JDW), 10 December 1997, 27-28.
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(AWACS). Despite Jiang's pronouncement that "We would rather have proficient personnel
waiting for weapons rather than equipment waiting for personnel," 187 maintenance and training
deficiencies have plagued the Su-27 program. Simply put, "attaining the needed standards of
training and support is much harder than obtaining airframes." 188 Absent any credible naval air
defense systems, the military recognizes that control of the skies is important not only for
continental conflicts but over the ocean as well. That is one reason refueling capability and open
ocean navigation exercises are increasingly being emphasized in the PLA-AF.
3. PLAN
With perhaps the highest modernization priority, the Navy has focused on both indigenous
production and foreign purchases. The new Chinese-built Luhu destroyers and Jiangwei frigates
reflect the Navy's emphasis on cruise missile technology in the 1980s. While a significant
improvement over past models, the ships still fall short in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and
over-the-horizon (OTH) capabilities, which are major considerations for any cross-strait or South
China Sea operations. The purchase of two Russian-built Sovremennyy class destroyers equipped
with the SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship cruise missiles, will provide a potent anti-surface capability
for the PLAN. Possibly the most important PLAN acquisition is the Russian Kilo class diesel
submarines. Two export versions have already been delivered, and the Chinese have negotiated
for two additional Kilos of a more capable variant that the Russians themselves use. There have
1 R7
Speech from Jiang Zemin at a meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC) 1 1 December
1997. "PLA told to arm itself for 21 st century," SCMP-IE, 13 December 1997.
188 «The People ' s Republic of China," 41
.
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been numerous reports about PLAN interest in obtaining an aircraft carrier. 189 However, Beijing
has reportedly conceded that acquisition of a carrier will be delayed until 2020 and probably
beyond. 190 Assuming its acquisition eventually becomes a reality, PRC possession of an aircraft
carrier will probably give the PLAN more headaches than capability enhancements as the admirals
worry about how to protect such a valuable asset. Nevertheless, it could be a force multiplier
against all the regional navies except perhaps Japan's.
Like the imported fighters, the Chinese will also run into significant training and
maintenance problems with the Russian-built ships and submarines. The technical proficiency and
support requirements to keep these sophisticated units at sea may overwhelm the Chinese.
Nevertheless, it will give them firsthand knowledge and experience that will be required once they
find the ability to produce such highly technology-driven platforms and weapons indigenously.
These new platforms will theoretically allow the PLAN to challenge regional navies and provide a
limited threat to the U.S. Navy. As one officer has written, "For the present and a fairly long
period to come, China's strategic focus will be in the direction of the sea." 191 The PLAN will be
the executor of this focus.
4. Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)
Also known as the Second Artillery Corps, the strategic force modernization seeks to
"develop the capacity to fight short, limited wars in the region while simultaneously posing a
189 GAO (1995), 20.
190
See Paul Beaver, "China will delay aircraft carrier," JDW, 3 June 1998, 26.
191 Mi Zhenyu, "LGEN Mi Zhenyu on China's Geostrategy," Beijing Junshi Kexue [China Military
Science], No.l (February 1998), translated in FBIS-CHI-98-208.
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significant nuclear deterrent to those global powers that might be tempted to intervene." 192 Both
conventional and nuclear missiles have been, or are in the process of being, upgraded. Improved
accuracy, survivability, and MIRV (Multiple Independently targeted Reentry Vehicles) capabilities
are all high priorities of the SRF. Conventional "short-range ballistic missiles hold the
promise... of dramatically and forcefully curbing Taiwan's moves toward independence while
avoiding real hostilities." 193
5. Doctrine
Changing doctrine is an important bellwether of Chinese security interests. As David
Shambaugh points out, it is how China "perceives the parameters of its national security interests
and the concomitant shifts in PLA doctrine that underlie the potentialities for the use of force in
the future." 194 The original Maoist doctrine of "people's war" has undergone two significant
modifications since the late 1970s. The first was a modification to a "people's war under modern
conditions." The second was a shift in 1985 "from fighting and winning an 'early war, major war
and nuclear war' to fighting and winning local armed conflicts on the periphery of China." 195 The
newest wrinkle is that of "active defense," which suggests a defensive policy with enough
flexibility to allow for punitive and preemptive offensive operations designed to meet the enemy
192




David Shambaugh, "The Insecurity of Security: The PLA's Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions
Towards 2000," 14.
195
For a more detailed explanation of the distinctions between the "people's war" and "the people's war
under modem conditions," the shift to fighting local wars on the periphery, and the concept of the "strategic
frontier" see Nan Li's "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics , 1985-1995: A Chinese
Perspective" in The China Quarterly (June 1996): 443-463.
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before he can get at Chinese vulnerabilities. 196 It is from this doctrinal perspective that the PLA
embarked on its serious modernization effort.
C. ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC TRENDS
The difficulties in determining the implications of PLA modernization for the future use of
force originate from two issues, both involving capability and intentions. First, though the PRC is
committed to PLA modernization, there is no guarantee that an effective modem military will
result. Indeed, their biggest security hurdle may be in translating modernization goals into actual
capability. Past Chinese attempts at military modernization along Western lines, such as the late-
19th century Self-Strengthening Movement, have been failures. Second, even if the PRC is
successful at building a modern military by the year 2020 as one official PRC study has
projected 197 , more malign intentions are not necessarily inevitable.
Meanwhile, one should examine where the PRC perceives its realm of strategic interests to
be. This brings us back to strategic frontiers. The data presented in this thesis agrees with David
Shambaugh's critique on China's strategic frontiers: 198
China's claimed strategic frontiers since 1949 have stretched beyond its immediate borders to
extend quite far into its regional periphery. The PRC has claimed territories in Mongolia,
eastern Russia, central Asia, Taiwan and the offshore islands, South and East China Seas.
Indochina border areas, and the Himalayan and Pamir mountain ranges. China has repeatedly
196
Lieutenant General Mi Zhenyu has also implied a.corollary to this doctrine that would allow PRC to
use force in order to protect interests in other states as well. He writes, "if nobody encroaches on anybody else, we
will encroach on no one, but if someone else encroaches on someone else, we must encroach on that someone."
This intimates the continued willingness of the Chinese to use force to protect regional interests in other countries
against hegemonic, or otherwise, encroachments into its perceived sphere of influence. Again, just exactly where
mis strategic frontier may be is the most cogent question. See "LGEN Mi Zhenyu on China's Geostrategy,"
translated in FBIS-CHI-98-208.
197
See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Hi-tech Military in Blueprint for 2020," 1 1 April 1998, SCMP-IE.
Shambaus
Towards 2000," 14-15.
1 8 gh, "The Insecurity of Security: The PLA's Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions
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demonstrated a willingness to deploy forces across its borders to protect its perceived strategic
frontiers and claimed territories.
Shambaugh has suggested, as it is asserted here, that the Chinese definition of strategic
frontiers has been expanding from purely continental focus to become increasingly maritime
oriented. He writes: 199
Today [1994] China's perceived strategic frontiers can be said to include the Indian Ocean
and Malacca Straits to the southwest, the South China Sea, the East China Sea in addition to its
current territorial boundaries and claimed jurisdiction over the aforementioned territories [listed
above].
Shambaugh argues that the shift in strategic frontiers began in 1987 with a now famous
Liberation Army Daily article that argued for Chinese lebensraum ("living space") and the
establishment of three "national gateways" on land, the sea, and space. It suggested:200
The "national gateway" concept of active defense that we are accustomed to using must be
pushed outward from traditional geographic borders to strategic boundaries. . . .For this purpose,
we need to build a three-dimensional menacing force that is able to protect China's legitimate
rights and interests [my emphasis], and is able to operate on a battlefield far removed from
China. For example, it would be a force able to move rapidly over great distances, and able to
carry out land warfare on a different scale and of different intensity in all-weather conditions, and
it would use long-range detection, interception, and strategic defensive and offensive weapons
systems for carrying out prompt counterattacks in space, on land and at sea.
More likely, this article represented only the publication of a decision reached by PRC elite as
long ago as 1974—the year the Chinese expelled the Vietnamese from the Paracels and began
atoll hopping southward. Subsequently, warming ties with the U.S. meant the dissipation of the
seaborne threat while providing the Chinese the flexibility to act on some of its long-standing
claims in the maritime region without facing too serious a reprisal from the U.S. or the
199
Ibid., 15.
Xu Guangyu, "Pursuit of Equitable Three Dimensional Strategic Boundaries," Jiefangjun Bao, 3
April 1987. Cited in ibid., 16. Note, the inclusion of "interests" provides for virtually unlimited Chinese
expansion based upon protection of these interests on "bartlefield[s] far removed from China."
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international community. Later in the 1980s and 1990s, as the Soviet threat degenerated and
eventually dissolved into a hapless (but still volatile) Russian Federation, the Chinese were
afforded more flexibility to pursue interests in the maritime sphere and shift almost completely
away from their continental military focus. Thus, it is not hard to see how the new PLA doctrine
of active defense fits almost seamlessly into the Chinese perception of strategic interests. The
international strategic setting has changed to allow a post-Cold War PRC to shift from luring the
enemy in deep to meeting the enemy at a distance.
For those who might doubt the validity of interpreting one article as a sign of a strategic
shift in the way the PRC leadership perceives the territorial limits of their interests, there have
been many others that confirm this initial eye-opening article. Another Liberation Army Daily
article in 1995 discussed the continental shelf (at more than two hundred miles wide China has
one of the broadest in the world) "as an extension of the land, assigning that portion of it that is a
natural extension of a country's territory to that country." The author also wrote of defending
this territory—which in China's case would account for an additional three million square
kilometers of territory and an estimated ten billion tons of petroleum reserves— "for the sake of
national interests."201
Another Chinese work is also concerned about living space. After spelling out the "three
million square kilometers" of "lost territories" in the past, the author writes, "Our area of survival
is shrinking.... Actually [we have to] reclaim sovereignty and sovereign interests in the
oceans-territojial seas, continental shelf and exclusive economic zones-a total area of three
Ye Xinrong, "China's Continental Shelves Defined," Jiefangjun Bao, 22 August 1995; cited in
FBIS-CHI-96-025.
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million square kilometers."202 Another work indicated two million square kilometers of
continental shelf that are within the territorial waters of China and are "therefore within the scope
of national defense."203 One PLAN officer correctly interpreted the Western naval heritage of
"'showing the flag" into a concept with "Chinese characteristics." In the "new era, state security is
more importantly expressed as economic security and environmental security." Therefore, the
"navy with its unique characteristic of 'using non-combat forms' must patrol the blue water in a
new guise as economic and diplomatic emissary....The enlightenment from historical experience
today is: if you cannot occupy yours, it is someone else's."204 The message of these writings is
clear, the ocean territory adjacent to the PRC, including all the economic resources held therein,
are the exclusive domain of the Chinese people and will be defended as part of the national
territory as it comprises the national comprehensive strength. 205
To demarcate their "active zones of defense" the Chinese have spoken of the first and
202
Allen S. Whiting, "The PLA and China's Threat Perceptions," The China Quarterly, No. 146 (June
1996): 600. Whiting was quoting here from a PLA authored book tided A New Scramblefor Soft Frontiers. The
author's name was not provided.
Colonel Fang Ning, "Defense Policy in the New Era," Chinese Views ofFuture Warfare, 46.
204
Lieutenant Commander Yang Zhiqun, "Officer's Forum - Brown Water, Blue Water - Thoughts on
Naval Theory," Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and Merchant Ships], No. 2 (8 February 1994), cited in Whiting, "The
PLA and China's Threat Perceptions," 600.
That being said, it is acknowledged that in August 1990 Premier Li Peng, while maintaining
exclusive rights of sovereignty, agreed to pursue joint exploitation of the SpraUys with the other six claimants in
the South China Sea. Notably, it did not apply to the Paracels. Ostensibly the Chinese maintained that their
proposal for joint development and peaceful resolution of the Spratlys issue was designed to "prevent tension."
Garver suggests the proposal was an attempt to stem the tide of diplomatic reversals Beijing had suffered since the
Tiananmen massacre, the East European revolutions of 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet communist party.
Equally important, he argues, was Beijing's motive of assuaging ASEAN fears of Chinese "expansionism." See
Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea," 1015-1016.
Little has come of the Chinese proposal. Perhaps the gesture was PRC grandstanding; or, the PRC recognized
that it was unlikely that any other country would agree to jointly develop because, in so doing, they would
implicitly recognize Beijing's claim.
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second island chains in which they could establish an effective defense commensurate with their
capability (see Figure 8). The first island chain extends from the Kamchatka peninsula, the
eastern edge of the Japanese islands, across the Ryukyus to Taiwan, through the Philippines, and
then runs south along the eastern edge of Celebes down to the Indonesian Molucca chain. 206
"Within this 'zone of active defense,' China plans to be the dominant power."207 The second
island chain extends from the Aleutians westward to 150° East latitude where it leads south
through the Bonin and Marianas groups to the eastern coast of Australia. Ultimately, the Chinese
hope to include the territory within the second island chain within their orbit and, if PLA
modernization fulfills expectations, within their power projection capabilities as well. 208 As James
Lilley has pointed out, the geographic orientation to China's active defense strategy places it in
the direct path of U.S. zones of strategic interests.209 U.S. interests in Japan, Taiwan, the
Philippines, the South China Sea and its crucial sea lanes of communication are all within the first
chain where China expects to be "dominant." The potential for conflicting U.S.-PRC interests in
the second chain—anchored on Alaska and Australia and sitting astride U.S. possessions in
Guam—where China expects to have considerable influence, is even more disconcerting.
206
"Introduction," Strategic Trends in China, 12-13. Note, the concept of first and second island chains
is attributed to General Liu Huaqing, former PLAN and PLA commander.
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James Lilley and Richard Solomon, "Strategic Perspectives," Strategic Trends in China, 49.
"Introduction," Strategic Trends in China, 13.
James Lilley and Richard Solomon, "Strategic Perspectives," Strategic Trends in China. 51. Already,
the U.S. is concerned about the PRC construction of a satellite tracking station on the South Pacific island nation of
Kiribati, conveniently near the U.S. Kwajalein Missile Test Range in the Marshall Islands. One PRC publication
has claimed this site has provided China "a strategic foothold in the South Pacific." See "Satellite Tracking











D. IMPLICATIONS FOR SENO-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS
Sino-American relations are complicated and getting more so as the relationship deepens.
To discuss their entirety in any detail is beyond the scope of this thesis. Some general points will
be made, however, as germane to PRC security interests and where they may conflict with the
U.S.
Despite the recent moves by China to free some well known dissidents, the ever-present
lure of the Chinese market and the "New China Lobby"210 may be winning out over the human
rights activists in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy. This is not necessarily deleterious and is in
fact good for continued amity between the two countries.
However, the U.S.-China relationship is tenuous, not because of Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang,
political freedoms, or even abutting zones of influence. Rather the overarching diametrically
opposed national policies provide the biggest challenge to Sino-American relations. Perhaps the
most fundamental U.S. national security strategy, as evidenced in the President's "National
Security Strategy," is "to shape the international environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests."
It also states that the U.S. "must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of
national power to influence the action of other states and non-state actors."211 American
"engagement," "enlargement," or whatever the current parlance may be, is still nothing less than
imparting U.S. influence into Chinese affairs. Even in its most benign form, U.S. engagement is
inimical to the Chinese professed view of international relations. The Chinese are obsessed with
avoiding as much as possible any influence by external actors in its decision-making-processes, or
210
See Bernstein's and Munro's chapter on this subject, 105-129.
211
"A National Security Strategy for a New Century," October 1998, The White House, 12, 6.
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in the decision-making-processes any other country within its perceived sphere of influence.
Thus, PRC hard-liners see the U.S. policy toward China as containment rather than
engagement—containment of China's rightful power and influence in the Asia-Pacific region. On
the surface this conflict may not be any different from relations between the U.S. and other
countries struggling to maintain freedom of action in the globalized single-superpower system that
dominates post-Cold War international relations. Yet, the hypersensitivity of the Chinese toward
making decisions based on foreign pressures plus their traditional Middle Kingdom view, make
the PRC-U.S. situation unique.
It is difficult to determine if the Chinese will choose to fight with the U.S. when their
opposing views collide. Certainly, the imperative of economic development and domestic stability
will preside over all but the most severe U.S. threats to PRC security. Even these two
imperatives could become a flash point, however, as the CCP struggles to reconcile economic and
ideational globalization with its desire to hold onto the reigns of power. "The perception that
vital interests or national survival are involved will lead to a willingness to sacrifice whatever is
necessary."
212 For now pragmatism is holding fast. Both countries are able to coexist with a
cautious but warming relationship.
E. MOST LIKELY AREAS OF CONFLICT
If the case study data and analysis have provided specific areas in which the PRC has used
force in the past, there are lessons which can be used to determine potential areas in which the
PRC deems defensible in the future. The PRC's strategic frontier, as determined in this thesis,
21
~ Chas. W. Freeman, "An Interest-Based China Policy," Strategic Trends in China, 124. Note, PRC
elites still consider CCP survival a prerequisite to national survival.
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does not necessarily imply the PRC will seek conflict inside their zone of active defense. But it
does mean that potential adversaries should be aware of Chinese interests within this sphere.
Several regions stand out as prospective zones of conflict.
1. Taiwan
The threats of the PRC to use force to settle the Taiwan problem are real. Despite signs
of increasing willingness to discuss the issue of unification, Taiwan remains the PRC's most likely
area to engage in conflict. Taiwan, after Macao is returned in 1999, is regarded by many on the
mainland as the last remaining scar of their century of humiliation. Indeed, the CCP has pointed
to reunification of the motherland as its most important issue. There exist at least five thresholds
which would impel the PRC to use force including: (1) Taiwanese declaration of independence,
(2) Taiwanese refusal to negotiate over the issue, (3) social and political disorder on Taiwan, (4)
interference of Taiwan's domestic affairs by another country, and (5) Taiwan's deployment of
nuclear weapons. 213 The most volatile of these and one that would perhaps engulf the region in a
larger conflict than just between the two Chinese "entities" is number four—the possibility of the
U.S. getting involved and using the Japanese Islands as staging bases for operations against the
People's Republic. Any Japanese involvement in a PRC-U.S.-Taiwan conflict would risk a
regional conflagration.
An even more frightening scenario would be North Korea hoping to gain an advantage
through military operations against a preoccupied United States. Albeit an attempt to assuage
Taiwanese fears and justify their position, Beijing has stated that their threat of force against
213 Wen-Cheng Lin, "Will Beijing Use Force on Taiwan?." in The Chinese PLA 's Perception ofan
Invasion of Taiwan, ed. Peter Kien-Hong Yu (New York: Contemporary U.S.-Asia Research Institute, 1996), 169-
170.
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Taiwan is "not directed against our compatriots in Taiwan but against the schemes of foreign
forces to interfere with China's reunification...."214 Whatever the reason, the People's Republic
has made it clear with both past and present actions that they will not hesitate to use force "at all
costs" to protect their territorial integrity and sovereignty over a Taiwan that has yet to see
communist control.
The PRC recognizes the dilemma and danger of using force against Taiwan. The dilemma
arises in the fact that the CCP has based much of its legitimacy on the reunification and eventual
return of the island. The Party has, in effect, backed itself into a corner. Any activation of the
above mentioned five tripwires compels the CCP to initiate conflict or lose legitimacy and perhaps
their Mandate of Heaven as well. The party is still equated with the state and a diminution or fall
of the Party means a similar fall of the PRC itself. However, to use force will probably result in
the virtual destruction of Taiwan's economy. If it were included, Taiwan would be the PRC's
wealthiest province. Destruction of Taiwan's economy would significantly set back the PRC's
economic development. Sanctions, disruption of trade and investment, and capital flight would
also hurt Beijing. The possibility of facing foreign intervention would give the PRC the choice of
escalating the war or "losing" Taiwan altogether. Lastly, the PRC must consider the implications
of letting Taiwan "get away" vis-a-vis its other provinces with separatist tendencies such as
Xinjiang and Tibet. The first one to fall could result in a Chinese domino effect and virtual
disintegration of the People's Republic.
Jiang Zemin, "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland," speech on 30 January 1995.
Obtained online at [http://members.aol.eom/mehampton/PRC/JZM.l.30.95.txt]. Note, this speech is Jiang's eight
point proposal to Taiwan.
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2. The Maritime Frontier
The chances of war within the Maritime Frontier are perhaps only second to that of
Taiwan. With the shift from a continental focus, the PRC has placed a significant strategic
interest in the maritime region. With interests come potential for conflicts. First is the South
China Sea. The PRC has already demonstrated its willingness to use force in the Paracels and the
Spratlys and will likely do so again. If the claims of establishment of a PRC dominant zone at the
first island chain are to be believed, then PLAN presence in these waters should increase. Indeed,
in January 1996 the Philippine Navy reported that Chinese vessels exchanged fire in a ninety
minute gun battle with a Philippine gunboat twelve nautical miles off Campones Island, only
seventy-two miles northwest of Manila. Beijing has denied that its vessels had strayed into
Philippine waters or traded fire with the Philippine gunboat. Manila decided not to file a
diplomatic protest, but the alleged skirmish was the first violent incident between the two
countries since their navies confronted each other near Mischief Reef.215 In a shrewd conciliatory
move that was bound to be rejected, Beijing offered Filipino fisherman use of their "shelter and
weather-tracking facilities" on Mischief Reef. Manila declined saying "we refuse to be tempted.
We want it back, it's ours."216
In late October 1998, Manila protested PRC "reinforcing their structures in Mischief
Reef." More than 100 Chinese are building large concrete barracks and possibly a pier capable of
handling large vessels. PLAN escort of construction vessels plus the military utility which a large
Source online at [http://www.taiwandc.org/hst-9596.htm].
216
See "Disputed reef 'to be opened,'" SCMP-IE, 31 July 1998, and "Manila turns down offer on
SpraUys," SCMP-IE, 5 August 1998.
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pier would provide, "showed 'there are other intentions on the part of the Chinese.'" The
Philippine Defense Secretary described Chinese actions in the Spratlys as a "creeping
invasion."217 In response, Manila increased it naval patrols "to discourage. ..Chinese vessels"
from entering the area. 218
Vietnam protested Chinese research vessels operating in the Spratlys in April 1998. The
Chinese countered with allegations of new Vietnamese "installations" in the Spratiys. However,
both sides still claim they are committed to settling their land and sea border disputes through
ongoing negotiations by 2000. 219
The vast oil deposits projected to lie under the seabed have yet to be discovered, but it
appears that natural gas is present in significant quantities. Thus, in addition to the Chinese claims
of sovereignty and national space, the economic potential still has a luring appeal. If we are to
believe Garver, the value of Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea has shifted from
geostrategic to economic. 220 The economic allure of the region has perhaps truncated Chinese
assertive actions. Fear of economic retaliation and the inaccessibility of resources in a bellicose
environment must be a concern for Beijing. However, as Garver noted even in 1992, "Because
217
See "Manila fury at new Spratly 'intrusion,'" SCMP-IE, 6 November 1998; "Memo on Spratlys
mission delayed," SCMP-IE, 10 November 1998; and "Chinese Building on Disputed Reef," The Associated Press,
1 1 November 1998. Note, the second article indicated that the Chinese had notified the Philippine Embassy in
Beijing of its intentions to repair the facilities two weeks in advance. Manila acknowledged, however, that due to a
"computer glitch" within its embassy, it did not receive the notice until after construction had started.
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See "Vietnam claims Beijing ship violated territorial waters," SCMP-IE, 21 May 1998; "Hanoi denies
troops seized Spradys reef," SCMP-IE, 10 September 1998; and "Beijing. Hanoi 'still committed' to year 2000
deadlines for border disputes," SCMP-IE, 30 September 1998.
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Garver. "China's Push Through the South China Sea," 1000.
115
each individual step has been so small and the costs of opposing China have seemed so large, the
inclination of both regional and extra-regional countries has been to acquiesce."221 Nevertheless,
the honeymoon is over for the Chinese in the South China Sea. They can no longer expect the
world to be caught off guard over their actions in the Spratlys. However, this in itself will not
deter further aggressive moves by the PRC. They will continue to have the PLA take advantage
of other claimants' weaknesses and seize opportunities as they arise. More importantly, the
significance of Chinese presence extending deep into Southeast Asia will, ipso facto, make them a
Southeast Asian nation and further complicate the issue of overseas Chinese in states such as
Malaysia, Indonesia and even Singapore. 222 Subsequently, the question of what really is Greater
China may have to be addressed as well.
Another maritime issue, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute, is contentious but
presently recognized by both parties as not necessarily worth instigating conflict.223 The Japanese
currently hold these small islands in the East China Sea, but this has not stopped nationalistic
groups within each country from asserting their government's claim. Danger exists in belligerent
individuals forcing their governments' hand in making the islands an issue.
The PRC will carefully regulate the chances for conflict that exist on China's Maritime
Frontier. As long as they are credible and not overwhelmed by another country, PRC claims and






In their 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, both sides agreed to defer discussion indefinitely. See
Whiting, "The PLA and China's Threat Perceptions," 604. For a Chinese perspective of the Diaoyutai dispute see
their U.S. embassy's statement online at [http://www.china-embassy.org/Cgi-Bin/Press.pl7236].
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enforcement of PRC sovereignty and territorial integrity can be acted upon until force projection
capabilities significantly improve. The economic and strategic gains must outweigh the risks
before any high profile claims are acted upon by force.
3. The Eastern Frontier
Senior Chinese security analysts see Japan as the PRC's most serious long-range military
threat.
224
This perception is based on the assumption that Japan will be China's main rival to
regional dominance in the next century. China has always resented Japan's relative success
against the Western imperial powers and despised the Japanese for becoming a member of the
imperial club partially at China's expense. However, in the near future, the main threat China sees
in Japan is its alliance with the U.S. Japan serves as the double antagonist of first aiding and
abetting attempted U.S. hegemony in the region; and second, containing the rise in Chinese power
and influence in the region. Simply put, Japan is a base of operations for non-Asian influence in
the region and a bulwark against spreading Chinese influence. The Chinese like neither.
In addition to the Diaoyutai Islands dispute, there are several areas of discord that could
lead to conflict. These include Chinese apprehensions about an expanding role for the Japanese
Self Defense Forces, 225 especially in the event of U.S. conflict in the region. Recent intimations of
a joint U.S.-Japan development of a theater missile defense system also concerns Beijing. 226 The
Whiting, "The PLA and China's Threat Perceptions," 609.
This shift toward an enhanced role of the Japanese military in promoting and preserving the regional
stability stemmed largely from the April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto summit and the subsequent Defense Guidelines
Review completed by both nations in September 1997. For the specifics of the agreement, see "Japan-U.S. Joint
Declaration on Security - Alliance for the 21 st Century," obtained online at [http://club.jpn.net/infomofa/ju/
security/security Jitml]. The author is thankful to Dan Evans for this information.
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Japanese are concerned with Chinese moves in the South China sea which could disrupt the flow
of incoming oil from the Persian Gulf to Japan. U.S. involvement in a Sino-Japanese dispute, the
relative weakness of the PLA compared to Japanese Self Defense Forces, and the disastrous
economic impact, would all likely inhibit PRC initiation of conflict. However, if Japan somehow
became involved in the Taiwan issue, PRC sensibilities might be too offended not to react with
force. Ultimately, the possibility of a Sino-Japanese conflict is small but may grow as Chinese
power and influence expand.
The Korean peninsula has been within China's strategic frontier for centuries, even
millennia, and continues to be of vital national interest. The situation has not changed with the
decline of North Korea and the concomitant decline in the PRC's partnership with that state. The
Chinese are still concerned about a post-reunification scenario in which they have diminished
influence on the peninsula. One analyst has observed that "China believes that the Republic of
Korea has 'won' and China is now trying to implement policies that will protect its vital
interests."227 Subsequently, since the 1980s the PRC has been making friendly gestures toward
the South Koreans who have been more than happy to reciprocate and drive a wedge between
Pyongyang and its biggest (and only) ally. Beijing's aim is not only to increase their influence on
the entire peninsula but also diminish and eventually, minimize U.S. presence. The chances of the
PRC becoming involved in conflict on the peninsula are relatively low and is contingent upon a .
post-unification scenario in which their perceived influence is superceded by an overbearing U.S.
presence.
7
Bonnie Glaser and Ronald N. Montaperto, "Northeast Asia," Strategic Trends in China, 118.
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4. The Southern Frontier
The PRC's southern land borders are secure. The Aksai Chin and NEFA regions are still
in dispute but have not led to any serious crises with the Indians. However, Indian and
subsequent Pakistani nuclear tests have heightened tensions on the subcontinent. The Indian
Defense Minister's declaration of China as India's number one threat228 and the murky Sino-
Pakistani weapons and nuclear technology relationship combine to bring China's influence into a
region that it does not necessarily wish to become embroiled. India has begun to establish its own
weapons procurement ties to Russia and is keeping close tabs on PRC military modernization and
development
—
particularly PLA ties to Burma. 229 Just as they did in 1962, however, PRC
strategists will be sure to avoid entanglement in a strategically less important area (compared to
the maritime realm) unless the status-quo is interrupted.
Vietnam is still within the PRC strategic frontier. Soviet usurping influence is no longer a
consideration but ironically Western influence may again eventually preside over the Chinese
historical legacy. The Chinese will be careful not to press the Vietnamese too hard for fear of
driving them into the not so open arms of the West. Like the maritime disputes, Sino-Vietnamese
continental border disputes hope to be resolved by 2000. As long as Vietnam struggles with
economic development, does not again seek a strategic ally other than China, or again seek
regional hegemony, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship will remain civil. These are big conditions,
Indian Defense Minister George Femandes comments created quite a stir, especially since they came
just weeks prior to India's May 1998 nuclear tests. For somewhat of a backpedal but not retraction from his
original statements, see "Critic seeks friendship with 'enemy No 1,"' SCMP-1E, 25 July 1998.
" See Rahul Bedi's two articles, "India and Russia to sign pact," and "China's modernisation is a great
concern' for India," JDW, 14 October 1998, 6, 14.
119
however. Any attempt by Vietnam to upset the status-quo or challenge Beijing in the South
China Sea could result in a deterioration of relations and perhaps even conflict.
5. The Northern Frontier
For the moment, the Chinese Northern Frontier is relatively stable. However, the Chinese
amity toward Russia may not be as deep as some would suggest. 230 At the end of the 20th century
there is a symbiotic relationship between the two powers founded on arms sales (Russia to PRC)
and both state's preoccupation with, and anxiety over, separatist movements. When the PLA is
no longer dependent upon Russian high-tech weaponry and the PRC can indigenously produce or
find alternative weapon sources, there may well be a Chinese turn away from Russia and a PRC
reassessment of the considerable irredentist claims against Russia in Northeast Asia. Traditional
grievances dating from Russia's imperialist policies in Asia but also the ideological and emotional
animosities that linger from the Sino-Soviet split serve to hinder any real deepening of the
relationship. It is essentially a tactical rather than strategic relationship.
Continued Russian weakness may provide Beijing the opportunity to press irredentist
claims in the Maritime Provinces (which constitute the largest remaining area of Chinese "lost
territories") or elsewhere along the lengthy former Soviet borders shared with the PRC. The
tempering factor to the PRC using force or the threat of force to assert such claims is Moscow's
continued preponderance of nuclear capability and their 1993 defense doctrine which allows for
the first use of nuclear weapons. 231 Nevertheless, historic PRC military opportunism, when
5
See as yet unpublished paper by C.G. Jacobsen, "Russia-China: the new "strategic partnership.'" June




conditions are propitious, provides enough evidence to caution against ruling out any scenario in




This thesis has attempted to discern patterns in PRC uses of force to attain foreign policy
objectives. First, however, an attempt was made to determine if there was an essence within pre-
communist Chinese history which favored or disdained the use of force to solve disputes.
Conventional wisdom says that it is the latter. Scholars such as John Fairbank theorized, based on
a Confucian and later Mencian tradition, that China had a pacifist tradition which eschewed the
use of force. This Confucian-Mencian Paradigm holds that the Chinese perceived the use of force
only as a last resort. Force was used primarily for defensive purposes with the occasional
exception of punitive wars. When it was necessary, it was most often used defensively in a
limited, controlled manner. Proponents of the Confucian-Mencian paradigm maintain that it
prevails in Chinese thinking even today. The Chinese would like the world to believe this view as
well.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, an alternative view began to emerge. Concurrent with the
rise of the comprehensive national strength of the People's Republic, a reassessment of the
conventional view toward the Chinese use of force led to the development of a parabeHum
strategic culture viewpoint. The parabellum paradigm asserts that Chinese culture was
historically not averse to using force to solve disputes and in fact sought resolution via military
means when conditions were favorable. It was argued that China was exceptionally flexible in its
application of force and was willing to use accommodationist strategies until conditions were ripe
for more assertive postures. This thesis argued that the pacifist-parabellum cultures coexisted
and alternated predominance in a rhythmic manner as the strength of the Chinese nation ebbed and
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flowed with the dynastic cycle. Today, embodied in the China Threat Theory, the fear exists that,
as Chinese national strength grows, so too will its propensity to use force to bully any opposition
and fulfill its aspirations of great power status.
While the literature is relatively sparse with respect to establishing patterns in PRC crisis
and conflict behavior, several conclusions have stood the test of time. Alan Whiting's emphasis
on timing and pauses in crisis and conflict has proven to be accurate. Incrementalism has been a
recurrent theme of PRC crisis and conflict behavior. Likewise, his determination that the PRC is
not averse to taking risks against a far superior military power, even in the face of war, has also
endured. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis reiterated this point.
Gerald Segal stressed a PRC tradition of pragmatic, at times opportunistic, flexibility in
the face of changing threats. Based on broad guidelines, he did not find any significant pattern of
PRC crisis and conflict management. His examination of PRC uses of force leads one, though not
necessarily Segal himself, to conclude the PLA has been used as an offensive tool more often than
not. The case study analysis provided here confirms this view—none of the PRC uses of force to
attain foreign policy objectives were within Core China.
Iain Alastair Johnston's use of MID data revealed the PRC had a greater propensity to use
force, especially in territorial disputes, than other states. The data presented in this thesis
confirms this view and carries the proposition one step further. Contrary to the theory that
territorial disputes will abate as the state increases in age, there has been a fairly consistent, if not
increasing tendency of the PRC to engage in territorial disputes as the Chinese have expanded
their frontiers and asserted additional irredentist claims.
None of the works reviewed, however, sufficiently analyzed PRC perceptions of
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sovereignty and their national strategic frontiers with their willingness to use force. China's
national territory has always been in a state of flux, expanding and contracting with the strength of
the nation. It was demonstrated that the Chinese, indeed Asian, view of spatial boundaries led to
ambiguity over what in fact was the territorial extent of the Middle Kingdom. The collision of
Western political theory and Asian political practices led to a blurring of the interrelationship of
suzerainty and sovereignty vis-a-vis influence and control that, in the minds of the PRC elite, still
exist today. Thus not only was Chinese and later PRC control expected within the recognized
borders of China without foreign interference, but they also expected predominating Chinese
influence in areas that have historically been under the suzerainty of the Chinese people.
Moreover, areas that have traditionally only been strongly influenced by Chinese culture are also
expected to fall within the PRC orbit. As the strength of the Chinese nation expands and
contracts, so does its definition and application of its influence as well as its concomitant strategic
frontier. This thesis demonstrated that the PRC has been willing to use force to ensure this
primacy of influence.
But to the Chinese, PLA actions in these regions have been justified as reunification of the
Motherland or fighting off imperialists and hegemonists. Their anxiety and mistrust of foreign
intrusion and interference are predominantly based on the treatment China received from the
imperial powers during their century of humiliation and are best exemplified by their obsession
with sovereignty. This work identified three areas in which the Chinese asserted their sovereignty
and influence: Core China, Greater China, and regionally. The case study pattern analysis
demonstrated that the second and third areas have provided the impetus for conflict more than
any other. Conflicts involving sovereignty within Greater China were essentially aimed at
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reunification. 232 Conflicts involving influence were regional. Thus, it was demonstrated that a
dual concept of PRC sovereignty exists that extends from territorial to influential. The latter
concept implies an assertion of Chinese influence in regions outside the territorial borders of the
PRC. Exactly where this perceived sphere of influence has been at any given time is difficult to
establish. But as the strength of the nation allowed, regions such as Tibet, Chinese Turkestan,
Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere fell within the Chinese and later PRC orbit.
The analyses of PRC conflicts confirms these points, and alarmingly perhaps, signal a
rising tide of expansion as the strength of the PRC grows and opportunities arise. The second
research question determined if any lessons from previous uses of force by the PRC can aid in
recognizing future uses of the PLA for foreign policy objectives. The second research question
was analyzed vis-a-vis PLA modernization, which has received renewed emphasis. Technology
and power projection are emphasized in the PLA's new force structure. Together with the
doctrine of active defense, this bodes for a PLA which seeks to meet the enemy at a distance or
on the periphery.
Aspirations for an advanced force capable of making this doctrine credible do not ensure
success. Nevertheless, PRC military modernization remains a regional concern. This work
identified where and how far PRC strategic interests might extend in the region. Certainly, there
has been a shift in PRC focus from a continental to a maritime frontier. PRC official
pronouncements and unofficial but sanctioned articles are clear in stating that a Chinese expansion
within the maritime frontier is needed to secure living space and economic resources. Two
232 The Sino-Indian conflict was categorized as Greater China because it was essentially an attempt by
India to seize previously "reunified" portions of Tibet and disrupt the status quo within the region.
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defensive island chain perimeters have been proposed as a demarcation of Chinese control and
interests. As the situation permits, Beijing will defend this territory as it is perceived to contribute
to the national comprehensive strength.
As PRC strength grows, Sino-American interests are surely going to collide. The
diametrically opposed national policies of PRC sovereignty versus American "shaping the
international environment'' will continue to plague the two countries' relations. As suggested,
however, the Chinese will be pragmatic and will not upset economic development which, along
with domestic stability, will remain the top priorities of the CCP.
Nevertheless, many sources of potential PRC conflict exist. Taiwan remains the most
volatile and contentious issue. Most likely, the PRC will back up its threats of force should it
perceive Taiwan as carrying its "splittist" activities too far. Only a slightly reduced chance for
conflict exists on China's maritime frontier where the territorial disputes over the South China Sea
continue. The PRC continental frontiers are relatively secure. As long as the Koreans, Indians,
Vietnamese, and Russians do not attempt to upset the status quo, the PRC will likely not instigate
conflict in these areas. Even the considerable irredentist claims against Russia in Northeast Asia
will not be pressed as long as the PLA remains dependent upon Russian military technology.
Finally, it must be said that this work is not an attempt to validate the China Threat
Theory. Quite the contrary, it is hoped that this thesis will help develop a greater understanding
,
of the PRC's decision to use force based on national interests and trends in previous PRC crisis
and conflict management. In that sense, this thesis' use of historical analysis was not for
predictive value, but for its ability to provide insights into the strategic context in which the PRC
functions. This may help our understanding of Chinese policies. Indeed, many PRC sovereignty
127
claims and territorial interests are legitimate and should not be viewed from an emotional or
nationalist perspective. Rather, we should analyze PRC interests and their willingness to use
force to protect those interests from a position of greater understanding of where they have been
and where they intend to go as a country. If we know China's interests, we can better calculate
when and where they will choose altercation over accommodation. If we understand the




Ames, Roger. "The Sunzi Legacy and Classical Western Strategy: A Tale of Two Warfares." In
Chinese Military Modernization, eds. C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon
Liu, 18-53. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1996.
An, Tai Sung. The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute. Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1973.
Austin, Greg. "The Strategic Implications of China's Public Order Crisis." Survival, Vol. 37, No.
2 (Summer 1995): 7-23.
Bernstein, Richard, and Ross H. Munro. The Coming Conflict with China. New York: Vintage
Books, 1998.
Binnendijk, Hans and Ronald N. Montaperto, eds. Strategic Trends in China. Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University, 1998.
Bin Yu. "What China Learned From Its 'Forgotten War' In Korea." Strategic Review (Summer
1998). Source obtained online at [http://ebird.dtic.mil/supplement/9807161earned.htm].
Candlin, A. H. Stanton. Tibet at Bay. American-Asian Educational Exchange, Inc., 1971.
Catley, Bob. and Makmur Keliat. Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea. Brookfield, VT:
Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997.
Chan, Steve. "Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessments from a Perspective of
Conflict Management." World Politics, No. 2 (1978): 391-410.
Chen Jian. "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969." The China Quarterly, No.
142 (June 1995): 356-387.
Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War. New York: University of Columbia Press, 1998.
Dobson, William J. and M. Taylor Fravel. "Red Herring Hegemon: China in the South China
Sea." Current History (September 1997): 258-263.
Dreyer, Edward L. China at War, 1901-1949. New York: Longman Publishing, 1995.
Fairbank, JohnK. and others. East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, 5th Edition. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1989.
Fairbank, John K. "Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience." In Chinese Ways
in Warfare, eds. Frank A. Kierman, Jr. and John K. Fairbank.Cambridge, 1-26. MA: Harvard
129
University Press, 1974.
Fairbank, John K. "A Preliminary Framework." In The Chinese World Order: Traditional
China's Foreign Relations, ed. John K. Fairbank, 1-19. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1968.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China (FBIS-CHI).
Garver, John W. "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic
and National Interests." The China Quarterly, No. 132 (December 1992): 999-1028.
Garver, John. Face Off. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.
Ginsburg, Norton. "On the Chinese Perception of a World Order." In China in Crisis, Vol. 2, ed.
Tang Tsou, 73-91. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.
Griffith, Samuel B. Sun Tzu: The Art of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Harding, Harry. "The Concept of 'Greater China': Themes, Variations and Reservations." The
China Quarterly, No. 136 (December 1993): 660-686.
Herman, Theodore. "Group Values Toward the National Space: The Case of China." The
Geographical Review, Vol XLDC, No. 2 (April 1959): 164-182.
Huntington, Samuel P. 7716- Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1996.
Speech of Jiang Zemin. "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland." 30 January
1995. Obtained online at [http://members.aol.eom/mehampton/PRC/JZM.l.30.95. txt].
Johnston, Alastair Iain. "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992: A First Cut
at the Data." The China Quarterly. No. 153 (March 1998): 1-30.
Johnston, Alastair Iain. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese
History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Krauthammer, Charles. "Why We Must Contain China," Time, 31 July 1995, 72.
Speech of Li Jijun, LTG, PLA at the United States War College. "Traditional Military Thinking
and the Defensive Strategy of China," 29 August 1997. Obtained online at [http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/ pubs97/china/chinap 1 .htm]
.
Levine, Steven I. "Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy."In Chinese Foreign
130
Policy: Theory and Practice, eds., Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995.
Maxwell, Neville. "The Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao." The China
Quarterly, No. 56 (October 1973): 730-739.
Nan Li. "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics , 1985-1995: A
Chinese Perspective." The China Quarterly (June 1996): 443-463.
National Security Planning Associates. "The People's Republic of China." In Asia-Pacific: Issues
and Developments, 29-58. Cambridge, MA: November 1997.
"A National Security Strategy for a New Century," October 1998, The White House.
Nguyen, Mann Hung. "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play Among Communist
Neighbors." Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 10 (October 1979): 1037-1052.
O'Ballance, Edgar. The Wars in Vietnam 1954-1980. New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1981.
Pillsbury, Michael, ed. Chinese Views ofFuture Warfare. Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University, 1997.
Robinson, Thomas W. "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict." In Diplomacy ofPower: Soviet Armed
Forces as a Political Instrument, ed. Stephen S. Kaplan, 265-313. Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, 1981.
Roy, Denny. "The 'China Threat' Issue: Major Arguments." Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVI, No. 8
(August 1996): 758-771.
Samuels, Marwyn S. Contestfor the South China Sea. New York: Methuen and Co., 1982.
Sawyer, Ralph D. Trans., The Seven Military Classics ofAncient China. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1993.
Segal, Gerald. Defending China. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Shambaugh, David. "Introduction: The Emergence of 'Greater China.'" The China Quarterly,
No. 136 (December 1993): 653-659.
Shambaugh, David. "The Insecurity of Security: The PLA's Evolving Doctrine and Threat
Perceptions Towards 2000." Journal ofNortheast Asian Studies, Vol. XIQ, No. 1 (Spring
1994): 3-25.
131
Shcphard. Allan. "Maritime Tensions in the South China Sea and the Neighborhood: Some
Solutions." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April-June 1994): 181-211.
777? Sino-Indian Boundary Question. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1962.
Song Qiang, and others. China Can Say No-Political and Emotional Choices in the Post-Cold
War Age. Beijing: China Industry and Commerce Publishing House, 1996.
77?^ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong).
Swanson, Bruce. Eighth Voyage of the Dragon. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982.
Tretiak, Daniel. "China's Vietnam War and its Consequences." The China Quarterly, No. 80
(December 1979): 740-767.
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security Division. Impact of China's Military
Modernization in the Pacific Region. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, June
1995.
Wang, Jianwei. "Coping with China as a Rising Power." In Weaving the Net: Conditional
Engagement with China, ed. James Shinn, 133-174. New York: Council on Foreign Relations
Press, 1996.
"White Paper-China's National Defense." Released by the Information Office of the State
Council of the PRC, 27 July 98. Obtained online from [http://www.china-embassy.org].
Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War. Santa Monica,
CA: The RAND Corporation, 1960.
Whiting. Allen S. The Chinese Calculus ofDeterrence. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of
Michigan Press, 1975.
Whiting, Allen S. "The PLA and China's Threat Perceptions." The China Quarterly, No. 146
(June 1996): 596-615.
Wich, Richard. Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study ofPolitical Change and Communication.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Zhang, Shu Guang. Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953.






Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 John J. Kingman Rd. STE0944
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218
2. Dudley Knox Library 2
. Naval Postgraduate School
41 1 Dyer Rd.
Monterey, CA 93943-5101
3. CAPT Frank C. Petho, Code NS/Pe . : 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
4. Dr. Edward A. Olsen, Code NS/Os 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
5. Dr. Denny Roy, Code NS/Rd 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
6. Monterey Institute of International Studies 1
ATTN: John Yung Rhee
425 Van Buren Street
Monterey, CA 93940
7. Betty N. McPherson 5
915 Dogwood
Katy, TX 77493
8. LT Darren G. McPherson ,2
915 Dogwood
Katy, TX 77493
133


\l
3 483NPG
TH
10/99 22527-200
E5S0

V
rfrf&$
c>


